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Roach: Wrongful Convictions in Canada

WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CANADA
Kent Roach*†

I. INTRODUCTION
An awareness of the alarming reality of wrongful convictions in both
Canada and other criminal justice systems led the Supreme Court of
Canada in 2001 to overturn prior jurisprudence that allowed Canada to
extradite fugitives to face the death penalty.1 The Court decided that
extradition to face the death penalty would generally violate the
principles of fundamental justice in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.2 The Court stressed that DNA would not be available in all
cases,3 and that even “a fair trial does not always guarantee a safe
verdict.”4 This case presents a challenge to all courts and policy-makers
to do better in responding to the risk of wrongful convictions.5 It is also
a reminder that all criminal justice systems that use the death penalty run
an unacceptable risk of executing an innocent person.
Another measure of the recognition of the reality of wrongful
* Professor of Law and Prichard-Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University of
Toronto. I thank the organizers of the 2011 Innocence Project Annual Conference for inviting me to
speak at that conference where a preliminary version of this paper was given. The financial assistance of
Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.
† This article is being published as part of a symposium that took place in April 2011 in
Cincinnati, Ohio, hosted by the Ohio Innocence Project, entitled The 2011 Innocence Network
Conference: An International Exploration of Wrongful Conviction. Funding for the symposium was
provided by The Murray and Agnes Seasongood Good Government Foundation. The articles appearing
in this symposium range from formal law review style articles to transcripts of speeches that were given
by the author at the symposium. Therefore, the articles published in this symposium may not comply
with all standards set forth in Texas Law Review and the Bluebook.
1. United States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7(Can.). Before this decision, Canada had extradited
fugitives to face the death penalty in the United States. See Re Ng, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (Can.); Re
Kindler, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (Can.). Note that all Supreme Court of Canada decisions are available at
http://scc.lexum.org/en/index.html.
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 § 7 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. app. II, no. 44 (Can.).
3. The Court noted that many miscarriages of justice revealed by the Criminal Cases Review
Commission in England and Wales did not depend on DNA testing and concluded, “[T]hese cases
demonstrate that the concern about wrongful convictions is unlikely to be resolved by advances in
forensic sciences, welcome as these advances are from the perspective of protecting the innocent and
punishing the guilty.” Burns, 2001 SCC 7, at ¶¶ 116.
4. Id. at 98. In reference to the David Milgaard case, the Supreme Court stated: “Milgaard was
represented by able and experienced counsel. No serious error in law or procedure occurred at the trial.
Notwithstanding the fact that the conviction for murder followed a fair trial, new evidence surfaced
years later.”
5. See Kent Roach, The Protection of Innocence Under Section 7 of the Charter, 34 SUP. CT. L.
REV. 249 (2006) for a detailed critical evaluation of the Court’s performance on various innocence
issues.
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convictions is that since 1986, provincial governments in Canada have
made discretionary decisions to call seven different public inquiries into
notorious wrongful convictions.6 The findings and recommendations of
these commissions of inquiry provide a unique and important source of
information about Canadian wrongful convictions. They also provide a
partially implemented reform agenda to prevent wrongful convictions.
The federal government in Canada has unfortunately been resistant to
implementing the recommendations of the provincial inquiries into
wrongful convictions, even though criminal law and procedure is
exclusively a matter of federal jurisdiction in Canada.
Canada has a legal system that is similar to the United States, with a
constitutional bill of rights enforced through an adversarial system. On
the other hand, the Canadian system is staffed only by appointed judges
and prosecutors, and has much more centralized policing and forensic
science systems than in the U.S. The Canadian system has wide rights of
appeal and generous tests for the admission of fresh evidence. It has
many similarities to the British system. Canada, like Australia, however,
retains a system where petitions to re-open cases after appeals have been
exhausted must be granted by elected politicians, unlike the independent
commission in England and Wales.
The first part of this Essay will examine what is known about the
number of wrongful convictions in Canada. Much depends on the
somewhat murky definition of a wrongful conviction. Even if there was
agreement about such a definition, the ultimate number of wrongful
convictions is unknowable, given that efforts to discover wrongful
convictions in Canada, as in the United States, have been focused on the
most serious cases, namely those involving homicide and sexual assault,
or both. That said, the Canadian experience is of interest because in
recent years an increasing number of wrongful convictions arising from
6. ROYAL COMM’N ON THE DONALD MARSHALL JR. PROSECUTION, DIGEST OF FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1989) [hereinafter MARSHALL INQUIRY]; COMM’N ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING
GUY PAUL MORIN, REPORT (1998) [hereinafter MORIN INQUIRY]; MANITOBA JUSTICE, INQUIRY
REGARDING THOMAS SOPHONOW (2001) [hereinafter SOPHONOW INQUIRY]; ANTONIO LAMER, LAMER
COMM’N OF INQUIRY PERTAINING TO THE CASES OF RONALD DALTON, GREGORY PARSONS AND
RANDY DRUKEN, REPORT AND ANNEXES (2006) [hereinafter LAMER INQUIRY]; PATRICK J. LESAGE,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF
JAMES DRISKELL (2007) [hereinafter DRISKELL INQUIRY]; EDWARD P. MACCALLUM, REPORT OF THE
INQUIRY INTO THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF DAVID MILGAARD (2008) [hereinafter MILGAARD
INQUIRY]; STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY
(2008) [hereinafter GOUDGE INQUIRY]. Most of the reports of these inquiries are available on the
internet. On the Canadian inquiries see Kathryn Campbell, Policy Responses to Wrongful Conviction in
Canada: the Role of Conviction Review, Public Inquiries and Compensation, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 145
(2005); Kent Roach, Inquiries and the Processes of Accountability, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 268, 268–93 (Stenning ed. 1995). Some of the Canadian inquiries have attracted international
attention. See, for example, ST. OF ILL., REPORT OF GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (2002), which relied heavily on the Canadian Morin Inquiry.
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guilty pleas have been discovered. This phenomenon suggests that the
unknown number of wrongful convictions may be much larger than
many have appreciated. In other words, wrongful convictions may result
not only from contested trials, but from the majority of cases in which
accused plead guilty.
The next part of this Essay will explore two case studies of wrongful
convictions to provide an overview of the main causes of wrongful
convictions, as well as the two main legal mechanisms for overturning
wrongful convictions. The first case study is the Donald Marshall Jr.
case. Marshall was as a young Aboriginal man from Nova Scotia,
imprisoned eleven years for a murder he did not commit. The Marshall
case was the subject of the first public inquiry into a wrongful
conviction in Canada. The inquiry first raised awareness about wrongful
convictions and it also made important recommendations about how to
prevent them in the future. The second case study will examine the case
of Tammy Marquardt, a young single mother from Ontario who was
imprisoned for thirteen years for the murder of her two and one-half
year old son, on the basis of erroneous forensic pathology expert
testimony that the cause of her son’s death was asphyxia.
These two case studies illustrate the two main ways that wrongful
convictions are revealed in Canada. Marshall’s murder conviction was
overturned after the federal Minister of Justice granted his petition for a
new appeal on the basis of fresh evidence and after Marshall had
exhausted appeals all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Marquardt’s wrongful conviction was overturned when the Supreme
Court of Canada granted her leave to make a late and normally out of
time appeal. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ontario court
of appeal. The court of appeal then held that the murder conviction was
a miscarriage of justice, in light of new forensic pathology evidence that
the cause of death was not asphyxia but unascertained. A new trial was
ordered, but the prosecutor withdrew charges and the trial judge
apologized for what happened to Marquardt.
The two case studies demonstrate some of the strengths of the
Canadian system in recognizing wrongful convictions, including a fairly
liberal approach to late appeals, the availability of bail pending appeal,
the reception of a wide range of fresh evidence, and the willingness of
Canada’s unelected prosecutors at times to agree to the reversal of
convictions on the basis of new evidence. At the same time, an
important weakness of the Canadian approach to reversing wrongful
conviction is the maintenance of a system in which an elected politician,
the federal Minister of Justice, has responsibility for re-opening cases
after appeals have been exhausted. The slow, adversarial and risk
adverse nature of this petition procedure will be examined. The federal
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government has refused to implement recommendations made by six
different public inquiries that an independent body patterned after the
Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) for England and Wales be
created. Another weakness the two case studies reveal is the haphazard
Canadian approach to the recognition of and compensation for wrongful
convictions. Compensation for wrongful convictions in Canada is
formally based on factual innocence, but there is no legal mechanism for
determining factual innocence.
Having examined the strengths and weaknesses of the legal
mechanisms for overturning wrongful convictions, this Essay will
examine the main causes of wrongful convictions and the role that
police, prosecutors, defence counsel, judges, and juries play in wrongful
convictions. The most important reform to prevent wrongful convictions
is likely the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1991 recognition of a broad
constitutional right of the accused to disclosure of all relevant
information the prosecution possesses.7 Many pre-1991 wrongful
convictions in Canada might have been prevented had such broad rights
of disclosure been respected.8 The Court’s decision was inspired by the
vision of the prosecutor as an official concerned with ensuring justice,
rather than winning. It also responded to the refusal of the federal
government to amend the Criminal Code to require disclosure as
recommended by the commission of inquiry into Marshall’s wrongful
conviction.
The role of the police in wrongful convictions will be examined, with
attention to the findings of various inquiries about tunnel vision. The
failure of the Criminal Code to regulate police interrogation and
identification procedures will be critically examined. Although the
Supreme Court has recognized that the dangers of false confessions
should influence the admissibility of confessions,9 there are limits to
judicial regulation of interrogation procedures. For example, Canadian
courts continue to allow testimony from jailhouse informers,10 and allow
prolonged stings and interrogations of vulnerable suspects that create
risks of false confessions.11 The courts also allow eyewitness
7. R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (Can.).
8. For examples of “historical” wrongful convictions that might have been prevented by full
disclosure see Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575 (Can.) (overturning 1959 murder conviction in part on the
basis of undisclosed material); Re Walsh, 2008 NBCA 33 (Can.) (overturning 1975 murder conviction
in part on the basis of undisclosed material); Re Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202 (Can.) (overturning 1972
murder conviction in part on the basis of undisclosed material); R. v. Henry, 2010 BCCA 462 (Can.)
(describing 1983 sexual assault convictions that were overturned in part on the basis of undisclosed
material). Note that many of these decisions are available at http://www.canlii.org/en/.
9. R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38 (Can.).
10. R. v. Brooks, 2000 SCC 11 (Can.); R. v. Hurley, 2010 SCC 18 (Can.).
11. R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48 (Can.); R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11 (Can.); R. v. Grandinetti, 205
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identifications to be made despite improprieties in obtaining such
identifications12 and concerns about the lack of probative value of
courtroom identifications.13 The courts allow police to be civilly sued
for negligent investigations, but the absence of established standards
makes it difficult to establish police negligence.14 The Parliament of
Canada has jurisdiction over all criminal law and procedure throughout
Canada, but has unfortunately failed to regulate police interrogation and
identification procedures.
Forensic evidence has played a role in many Canadian wrongful
convictions and the findings of various inquiries and related judicial
decisions will be examined. In 2007, the Supreme Court held in a 4–3
decision that post-hypnosis identifications should not be admitted,
because of their unknown reliability and the risk of wrongful
convictions.15 This decision presents a potential for Canadian courts to
place stricter reliability-based restrictions on the admissibility of expert
evidence, including unreliable forensic evidence. At the same time,
various inquiries have made many important recommendations about
reforming the practice of the forensic sciences. Many of these
recommendations have been implemented, though the tendency has
been to do so on a discipline-by-discipline basis in particular
provinces.16
The Essay will also explore the role of defence lawyers in Canadian
wrongful convictions. Canada’s constitutional standard of ineffective
assistance of counsel, based on Strickland v. Washington,17 is not
particularly effective in reducing the risk of wrongful convictions.
Canada has remained too wedded to restrictive rules of jury secrecy,
despite some evidence that jurors have contributed to wrongful
convictions.18 The Essay will also examine the role of judges in
wrongful convictions, including the performance of appeal courts in
Canada and their refusal to adopt a “lurking doubt” standard for
reversing convictions.19
The last part of this Essay will examine compensation for the
wrongfully convicted, including the steps that Canada has taken to
comply with Article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and
SCC 5 (Can.); R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 (Can.).
12. Mezzo v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802 (Can.).
13. R. v. Hibbert, 2002 SCC 39 (Can.).
14. Hill v. Hamilton Wentworth Police, 2007 SCC 41 (Can.).
15. R. v. Trochym, 2007 SCC 6 (Can.).
16. Although criminal law and procedure is a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction in Canada,
the administration of justice is subject to provincial jurisdiction.
17. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) followed in R. v. G.D.B., 2000 SCC 22 (Can.).
18. R. v. Pan, 2001 SCC 42 (Can.).
19. R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15(Can.); R. v. W.H. 2013 SCC 22.
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Political Rights with respect to compensation. There is no statute
governing compensation and restrictive administrative guidelines are
often ignored in practice. Although Canadian governments formally
require factual innocence for compensation, there is no legal mechanism
for establishing factual innocence in Canada.
II. THE NUMBER OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CANADA
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine the number of
wrongful convictions in Canada. One reason is ambiguity about what
constitutes a wrongful conviction.20 Another reason is an unwillingness
of the legal system to make determinations of innocence. Yet another
reason is that there is simply no way to determine how many wrongful
convictions occur, but remain undetected.
Most recognized wrongful convictions in Canada, as in the United
States,21 arise in homicide or sexual assault cases, even though these
cases constitute only a small percentage of all criminal cases and
convictions. These identified wrongful convictions may be the
proverbial tip of the iceberg in the wider universe of criminal cases.
Such concerns have increased in Canada, because a number of recently
20. Wrongful convictions especially in the context of DNA exonerations and public and media
discourse are sometimes limited to those who have been proven to be factually innocent. See BARRY
SCHECK, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2001). In many cases, however, it may not be possible to make
definitive conclusions about factual innocence. In British-influenced systems, the term miscarriage of
justice includes not only the conviction of the innocent, but convictions that are improper and
overturned on appeal. For various approaches to the definitional issue see Clive Walker, Miscarriages of
Justice in Principle and Practice, in JUSTICE IN ERROR 37 (Walker and Starmer eds., 1993) (containing
a broad definition of miscarriage of justice by including rights violations and detention under unjust
laws); MICHAEL NAUGHTON, RETHINKING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE BEYOND THE TIP OF THE
ICEBERG (2007) (explaining that miscarriages of justice are broadly defined to include all successful
appeals); Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terror, 109 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 967 (2005) (containing a narrower definition of miscarriage of justice to include those who
should not be detained under the liability rules of the relevant legislation); Michael Naughton, The
Importance of Innocence for the Criminal Justice System, in CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, HOPE
FOR THE INNOCENT? 31 (Naughton ed., 2010) (focusing on claims of “factual innocence”). This Essay
will not enter into this important definitional debate but will, consistent with Canadian legal practice,
define wrongful convictions somewhat more broadly than cases of proven factual innocence given the
difficulty and impossibility of establishing factual innocence in many cases lacking DNA evidence as
well as the reluctance of the Canadian system to make determinations of factual innocence. See Re
Milgaard, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 875 (Can.); Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575 (Can.) (examples of courts not
finding innocence in cases widely accepted as convictions of the innocent); Re Mullins-Johnson, 2007
ONCA 720 (Can.) (a criminal appeal court determining it had no jurisdiction to make determinations of
“factual” innocence).
21. Samuel Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005) (4% of exonerations in cases that did not involve murder or rape); SAMUEL
GROSS AND MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989-2012: REPORT BY THE
NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 18. available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf (18% of exonerations in cases that
did not involve murder or rape).
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revealed wrongful convictions stem from cases where the accused
pleaded guilty.22 The fact that those who plead guilty may be innocent
suggests that the potential pool of the wrongfully convicted has
increased from those who are tried and convicted to the much larger
numbers who decide to plead guilty. Defendants often plead guilty in
response to incentives such as reduced sentences that the state offers.
They also plead guilty because of the practical difficulties of defending
oneself against the state’s much greater resources.
The criminal justice system in Canada does not generally recognize
factual innocence. There is also no consistent definition of what
constitutes a wrongful conviction. Canadian appellate courts can
overturn convictions on a number of grounds, including not only error of
law, but also that the guilty verdict is unreasonable, that it cannot be
supported by the evidence, or that “on any ground there was a
miscarriage of justice.”23 In addition, the Minister of Justice can re-open
convictions after appeals have been exhausted on the ground that “there
is a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of justice likely
occurred.”24
The term miscarriage of justice is not defined in legislation, but has
been broadly defined by courts to include cases
where there was no unfairness at trial, but evidence was admitted on
appeal that placed the reliability of the conviction in serious doubt. In
these cases, the miscarriage of justice lies not in the conduct of the trial or
even the conviction as entered at trial, but rather in maintaining the
conviction in the face of new evidence that renders the conviction
factually unreliable.25

Miscarriages of justice are not limited to cases of proven or factual
innocence, and include both cases where there have been unfair trials or
the reliability of the conviction is in serious doubt. Justice Kaufman, in
an important report advising the Minister of Justice whether to re-open a
conviction, has stressed that a miscarriage of justice would occur either
if an innocent person was convicted or if new evidence could reasonably
22. R. v. Marshall, 2005 QCCA 852 (Can.) (explaining a case where a mentally disabled person
who was falsely accused confessed and pleaded guilty to sexual assault, but was later exonerated by
subsequent DNA evidence); R. v. Hanemaayer, 2008 ONCA 580 (Can.) (explaining a case in which the
conviction of an innocent person for breaking and entering, and committing assault and assault with
threatening to use a weapon was overturned after a guilty plea had been entered); R. v. Sheratt
Robinson, 2009 ONCA 886 (Can.); R. v. C.F., 2010 ONCA 691; R. v. C.M., 2010 ONCA 690 (Can.);
R. v. Kumar, 2011 ONCA 120 (Can.); R. v. Brant, 2011 ONCA 362 (Can.) (describing cases where
parents pled guilty to reduced homicide in their child’s death in the face of forensic pathology evidence
later shown to be unreliable).
23. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s.686(1).
24. Id. s.696.3(3)(a).
25. Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575, ¶ 110 (Can.).
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have affected the verdict. In the latter circumstances, “it would be unfair
to maintain the accused’s conviction without an opportunity for the trier
of fact to consider new evidence.”26 Thus convictions in Canada can be
both re-opened and quashed on grounds short of proven innocence. This
is a strength of the Canadian system, given the practical difficulties of
establishing innocence in a definitive manner.
The issue of what constitutes a wrongful conviction in Canada is
further complicated because appeal courts have decided that they lack
statutory jurisdiction to make findings and declarations of factual
innocence.27 At the same time, however, they do make findings of
miscarriages of justice, sometimes describe cases as wrongful
convictions, and have made apologies to the accused in cases where
long standing convictions have been overturned on the basis of new
evidence and where the innocence of the person is generally accepted in
the media and elsewhere.28 Canadian appellate courts also enter
acquittals, as opposed to ordering new trials, in cases where they are
convinced that no reasonable jury could convict29 and also in old cases
where they conclude that the accused would probably be acquitted at a
hypothetical new trial.30
Not all those who are recognized in the media or the courts as
wrongfully convicted will necessarily obtain an acquittal. In the case of
Romeo Phillion, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in a divided 2–1 decision,
overturned his 1972 murder conviction. The Court of Appeal did not
enter an acquittal because of its conclusion that a hypothetical jury at a
new trial could reject his alibi evidence and still accept what he claims
were his false confessions.31 The prosecutor’s subsequent decision to
withdraw the murder charges, but not to offer any evidence so that
Phillion could receive a not guilty verdict, was upheld as consistent with
constitutional guarantees of fundamental fairness.32 At the same time,
the media and innocence projects widely acknowledge Phillion as a
wrongfully convicted and innocent person. The recognition of innocence
and exoneration is a political, social, and scientific process that the
criminal justice system does not fully support.33
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

HON FRED KAUFMAN, REPORT ON THE STEPHEN TRUSCOTT APPLICATION ¶ 164 (Sept. 2004).
R. v. Mullins-Johnson, 2007 ONCA 720 (Can.).
Id.
R. v. Hinse, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); Re Walsh, 2008 NBCA 33 (Can.).
Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575 (Can.); R. v. D.R.S. 2013 ABCA 18 (Can.).
Re Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202, ¶ 244 (Can.).
R. v. Phillion, 2010 ONSC 1604 (Can.).
Kent Roach, Exonerating the Wrongful Convicted: Do We Need Innocence Hearings, in
HONOURING SOCIAL JUSTICE 55–84 (Beare ed., 2009). For arguments about differences between legal
and media understandings, see SCHIFF & NOBLES, UNDERSTANDING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: LAW,
MEDIA AND THE INEVITABILITY OF CRISIS (2000). For arguments that declarations of innocence should
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Although factual innocence is not generally recognized in the
Canadian criminal justice system, it is formally required for payment of
compensation. Federal and provincial guidelines for compensation
require factual innocence, even though criminal courts do not make such
findings. Section 748(3) of the Criminal Code provides that when the
Governor-in-Council grants a free pardon “that person shall be deemed
thereafter never to have committed the offence in respect of which the
pardon is granted.” This provision suggests that a free pardon may be a
means to recognize innocence in Canada. In 1992, the Supreme Court
indicated that a free pardon would be the appropriate remedy if David
Milgaard satisfied the very high standard of establishing his innocence
beyond a reasonable doubt.34 Milgaard did not satisfy this high standard
at the 1992 reference. He was only exonerated and paid $10 million in
compensation in 1997 after a DNA exclusion. The Milgaard case stands
as a reminder of the difficulties of establishing innocence in the
Canadian legal system, especially in cases where there is no DNA or
other scientific evidence that is accepted as definitive.35
Pardons are an awkward and arguably inappropriate device to
recognize an accused’s innocence.36 One problem is the connotation of
pardons with mercy. Another problem is that the federal Cabinet, and
not the courts, grants pardons. A public inquiry in Canada recommended
three women be given free pardons because they killed in legitimate
self-defence. The Cabinet, however, refused to grant the free pardons
because of concerns about public safety and the lack of compassionate
grounds that were not related to the question of guilt or innocence.37
Another measure of the number of wrongful convictions in Canada is
the number of public inquiries, appointed by governments, into such
be available in Canadian law, see Christopher Sherrin, Declarations of Innocence, 35 QUEENS L.J. 437
(2010).
34. Reference re Milgaard, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 866 (Can.); see also, Re Therrien, 2001 SCC 35, ¶
121 (Can.) (recognizing the distinct nature of the free pardon). In the Milgaard reference, the Supreme
Court recommended that Milgaard should receive a new trial. It also indicated that it would be open to
the prosecutor not to proceed and to issue a prosecutorial stay and suggested that Milgaard should
receive a conditional pardon if he was convicted at a new trial. The prosecutor did issue a stay while
publicly maintaining his belief in Milgaard’s guilt until Milgaard’s 1997 DNA exoneration.
35. Before the Ontario Court of Appeal held it had no jurisdiction to make declarations of factual
innocence, it decided that it could not declare Stephen Truscott to be innocent and speculated that it
would be difficult to make any such declarations in the absence of DNA evidence. Re Truscott, 2007
ONCA 575, ¶ 264 (Can.) (“The appellant has not demonstrated his factual innocence. To do so would
be a most daunting task absent definitive forensic evidence such as DNA. Despite the appellant’s best
efforts, that kind of evidence is not available.”).
36. They are used less frequently in Canadian wrongful conviction cases than American cases
where 68 of 250 DNA exonerations obtained a pardon. BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT 230 (2011).
37. Gary Trotter, Justice, Politics, and the Royal Prerogative of Mercy: Examining the SelfDefence Review, 26 QUEENS L.J. 353, 392 (2001).
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matters. Since 1986, seven public inquiries have been appointed. These
inquiries generally are headed by sitting or retired judges. They take a
few years to examine and hold public hearings into wrongful
convictions and to make recommendations for their prevention.38 Public
inquiries are appointed at the discretion of the provincial governments
and have only been appointed in a minority of all cases in which
wrongful convictions have been recognized. The inquiries are generally
only held when wrongful convictions have received sustained media
attention, thus creating pressures on governments to respond by
appointing an inquiry.
Canada’s leading innocence project, the Association in Defence of the
Wrongfully Convicted (AIDWYC), at present lists forty-three cases of
wrongful convictions, starting with the 1959 conviction of Stephen
Truscott. Eighteen of these cases are listed as exonerations.39 The
eighteen exonerations recognized by AIDWYC are all homicide cases,
except two that involved sexual assault and one that involved a break
and enter. The profile of recognized wrongful convictions in Canada is
closer to the profile of wrongful convictions in the United States40 than
the United Kingdom.41 In other words, the vast majority of recognized
wrongful convictions in Canada, like the United States, involve
homicide or sexual assault. As such, the North American cases do not
represent the wider range of cases that the CCRC has referred back to
the court of appeal and the convictions that have been overturned in
England and Wales.42 The fact that recognized wrongful convictions in
Canada are generally limited to homicide or sexual assault cases
suggests that many wrongful convictions may remain undetected in less

38. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE DONALD MARSHALL JR. PROSECUTION (1989); THE
COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN (1998); THE INQUIRY REGARDING
THOMAS SOPHONOW (2001); THE LAMER COMMISSION OF INQUIRY PERTAINING TO THE CASES OF
RONALD DALTON, GREGORY PARSONS AND RANDY DRUKEN (2006); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF JAMES DRISKELL (2007); REPORT
OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF DAVID MILGAARD (2008); REPORT OF THE
INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY (2008). MARSHALL INQUIRY, supra note 6; MORIN
INQUIRY, supra note 6; SOPHONOW INQUIRY, supra note 6; LAMER INQUIRY, supra note 6; DRISKELL
INQUIRY, supra note 6; MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6.
39. Case Overview, ASSOC. IN DEF. OF THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED, http://www.aidwyc.
org/AIDWYC_Cases.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2011) [hereinafter AIDWYC] (containing an
international website lists 73 cases from Canada); see also Hans Sherrer, Wrongfully Convicted
Database Index, FORE JUSTICE, http://forejustice.org/db/location/innocents_l.html (last visited Nov. 26,
2011).
40. See, e.g., Samuel Gross et al, Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005); BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011).
41. LAURIE ELKS, RIGHTING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: TEN YEARS OF THE CRIMINAL CASES
REVIEW COMMISSION (2008).
42. DNA exonerations may be slightly less important in Canadian than American profiles with 7
of the 19 exonerations recognized by AIDWYC involving DNA. See AIDWYC, supra note 39.
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serious cases. Cases other than murder and sexual assault have been
overturned in England and Wales, suggesting that an independent
review commission in Canada might help discover more wrongful
convictions.43
How many wrongful convictions in Canada are never detected? Even
if the error rate resulting in wrongful convictions in Canada was
exceedingly small,44 there may be large numbers of undiscovered
wrongful convictions, given that about 90,000 criminal court cases
result in a person being sentenced to custody in Canada each year. An
error rate of only 0.5% would result in approximately 450 wrongful
convictions a year. Two-thirds of cases in adult criminal court result in
convictions on the basis of guilty pleas, but given the recent evidence of
innocent people making both irrational and rational decisions to plead
guilty,45 it cannot be assumed that all those in Canada who plead guilty
actually are guilty. The prosecution terminates most of the remaining
third of criminal cases. Only 3% of cases result in an acquittal,46
suggesting that criminal trials only reject a very small percentage of all
prosecutions.
43. At the same time, some of the cases where convictions were quashed after a CCRC referral
may not be accepted by all as wrongful convictions and the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry
Commission which has a mandate restricted to claims of proven factual innocence has referred
comparatively fewer cases than the CCRC. See BIBI SANGHA, ET AL., FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS AND
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 351–56 (2010); see also Kent Roach, The Role of Innocence Commissions:
Errors Discovery, Systemic Reform or Both?, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 89 (2010).
44. See C.R. Huff, Wrongful Convictions and Public Policy, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2002)
(applying a similar methodology to much larger numbers of felony convictions in the United States).
45. For an example of an irrational decision to plead guilty by a mentally disabled accused who
provided a false confession see R. v. Marshall, 2005 QCCA 852 (Can.). For an example where the
accused who had already served 8 months in pre-trial custody may have made a rational decision to
plead guilty to break and enter and assault after being wrongfully identified in court and being offered a
sentence of two years less a day see R. v. Hanemaayer, 2008 ONCA 580, ¶ 18 (Can.), where Rosenberg
J.A., stated, “[T]he court cannot ignore the terrible dilemma facing the appellant. He has spent eight
months in jail awaiting trial and was facing the prospect of a further six years in the penitentiary if [he]
was convicted. . . . The justice system held out to the appellant a powerful inducement that by pleading
guilty he would not receive a penitentiary sentence.” Note, in Canada those serving sentences of two
years and more serve them in federal penitentiaries and those serving less than two years serve their
sentences in provincial correctional institutions. See R. v. Kumar, 2011 ONCA 120, ¶ 34 (Can.)
(recognizing the “powerful inducement” of a guilty plea in a child death case where the prosecutor
withdrew a murder charge and a father who pled guilty to criminal negligence causing death received a
90 day sentence and was able to maintain custody of his other children and avoid deportation); see
generally Joan Brockman, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Pleading Guilty when Innocent, 56 CRIM. L.Q.
116 (2010).
46. In total, the adult criminal courts dispose of almost 400,000 cases a year involving 1.1
million charges. Jennifer Thomas, Adult Criminal Court Statistics 2008/2009, 30 JURISTAT. 4 (2010),
available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/11293-eng.pdf. More recent data
has found just under 86,000 cases resulting in custody in Canada in a year but that the median custodial
sentence was 30 days. Mia Dauvergne Adult Criminal Court Statistics 2010/2011, 28 (2012), available
at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/article/11646-eng.pdf. Most people serving a
sentence of a few months or less would not have the incentive to contest a wrongful conviction.
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In summary, there is an increasing recognition of the reality of
wrongful convictions in Canada, with many cases being recognized as
wrongful convictions. A number of recent wrongful convictions,
stemming from guilty pleas, suggest that the incidence of wrongful
convictions among the majority of accused who pled guilty may be
higher than previously appreciated. The Canadian criminal justice
system only acquits about 3% of cases that are prosecuted, again
suggesting that the criminal trial only infrequently protects the innocent.
It is simply impossible to determine how many wrongful convictions
occur but remain undetected. Most discovered wrongful conviction
cases in Canada, as in the United States, are homicide or sexual assault
cases and generally require much time and pro-bono assistance to
reveal. This again suggests that there may be many undiscovered
wrongful convictions in Canada.
III. TWO CASE STUDIES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
The following case studies examine one of the oldest recognized
wrongful conviction in Canada—the 1971 conviction of a seventeen
year old Aboriginal man Donald Marshall Jr. for a murder that he did
not commit, and one of the most recently recognized wrongful
convictions—the 1995 murder conviction of a twenty-one year old
woman, Tammy Marquardt, for the killing of her son. Marshall served
eleven years in jail and Marquardt served thirteen years in jail.
A. The Wrongful Conviction of Donald Marshall Jr.
Donald Marshall Jr. was convicted in 1971 of the murder of Sandy
Seale in the Nova Scotia community of Sydney. The seventeen year-old
Aboriginal man was known to the local police and the lead investigator
badgered three teenaged witnesses until they eventually testified at
Marshall’s preliminary inquiry that they saw Marshall stab Seale in a
park. In reality, Roy Ebsary had stabbed both Marshall and Seale. None
of the witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements that they had not seen
Marshall stab Seale were disclosed to the accused. At the time, there
was no right to disclosure and disclosure was voluntary. The prosecutor
in the case often provided disclosure, but Marshall’s lawyers did not
even ask for disclosure. Two of the witnesses attempted to recant their
false testimony at trial, but the judge disallowed full cross-examination
about why one witness had recanted out of court. The judge seemed to
assume that the recantation may have been related to threats from
Marshall, even though Marshall had been denied bail and was
imprisoned. Another witness at first declined to testify at trial that
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Marshall had stabbed Seale, but eventually did so after his prior
testimony to that effect at a preliminary inquiry was read to him as a
prior inconsistent statement.
Marshall testified at his trial before an all-white, all-male jury that a
man who fit Ebsary’s description had made racist remarks about both
Marshall and Seale, who was African-Canadian, and stabbed them both.
Marshall was not allowed to ask prospective jurors questions about
racial bias, as he would be now,47 and one of the jurors explained the
verdict later to a reporter through racist assumptions.48 The commission
of inquiry that subsequently examined Marshall’s wrongful conviction
did not examine the jury’s verdict, despite the fact that the conviction
depended on them finding the testimony of witnesses, who reluctantly
lied and said they saw Marshall stab Seale, more credible than
Marshall’s testimony that he did not stab Seale, and the possibility that
the jury might have been influenced by irrelevant evidence such as
Marshall’s “I hate cops” tattoo and the testimony of Seale’s grieving
parents.
Marshall’s own lawyers, though well paid by Marshall’s Indian band,
conducted no independent investigation and may have believed that
Marshall was guilty, in part because Marshall was Aboriginal.49
Marshall was also not well represented at his first appeal, with his
lawyers not raising legal errors, such as the prevention of a full crossexamination of a recanting witness, errors that the inquiry subsequently
found would have prevented his wrongful conviction. Marshall’s
lawyers also unsuccessfully argued to the court of appeal that the lesser
offence of manslaughter should have been left to the jury,50 something
that was inconsistent with Marshall’s constant claims of innocence. A
three-judge panel of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal unanimously
dismissed Marshall’s appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada
subsequently refused to grant leave to appeal.
Ten days after Marshall’s conviction, James McNeil told the police
that his companion Ebsary, and not Marshall, had killed Seale.
Unfortunately, this new evidence known to both police and prosecutors
was not disclosed to the accused at the time. It was, however, eventually
used as new evidence to reverse Marshall’s conviction. Because his
appeals had been exhausted, Marshall had to petition the federal
Minister of Justice for the mercy of the Crown. He obtained an order for
a new appeal in 1982, but only after the Chief Justice of Nova Scotia
47. R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (Can.).
48. Kent Roach, Inquiries and Processes of Accountability, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 268, 268–93 (Stenning ed., 1995).
49. MARSHALL INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 77.
50. R. v. Marshall, (1972) 8 C.C.C. (2d) 329 (Can.).
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had expressed reservation about hearing the case as a simple reference,
which would have meant that Marshall would not bear the burden of
proof or face the possibility of a new trial.51 Marshall was granted bail
pending this new appeal.
In 1983, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal quashed Marshall’s murder
conviction after considering new evidence, including McNeil’s
testimony that he was with Ebsary when Ebsary stabbed Seale. The
prosecutor in the case agreed that an acquittal should be entered, though
he was pressured by his superiors not to do so. At the same time, the
court of appeal blamed Marshall for his wrongful conviction. The court
of appeal stated that Marshall had perjured himself by not admitting that
he and Seale had intended to rob Ebsary and concluded that “any
miscarriage of justice is, however, more apparent than real.”52 Although
legal errors played a role, Marshall’s wrongful conviction was factually
based. Both the jury that convicted him and the Court of Appeal that
eventually overturned his conviction simply refused to believe that
Marshall was telling the truth, despite the existence of other evidence
that supported the truth of his statements.
The inquiry subsequently criticized the court of appeal for defending
the justice system at Marshall’s expense and for allowing a person who
had been attorney general and ultimately responsible for Marshall’s
prosecution to sit as a judge on the appeal. The inquiry, however, lost a
court battle to have the judges on the reference explain themselves on
the grounds that such questioning would interfere with judicial
independence.53 The five court of appeal judges who sat on the reference
were subsequently found by the Canadian Judicial Council, composed of
judges, to have engaged in misconduct, but not misconduct that
warranted their removal from the bench.54 Marshall attempted to sue the
police, but his case was dismissed when he could not post security for
costs. He subsequently received $225,000 plus interest in compensation.
A 1989 inquiry into Marshall’s wrongful conviction contributed to his
official exoneration, with a report that included a refutation of the court
of appeal’s conclusion that Marshall had been engaged in robbery. The
inquiry recommended that the Criminal Code be amended to require the
prosecution to disclose useful information to the accused. Parliament did
not act, but the Supreme Court cited the Marshall case and the inquiry’s
51. MARSHALL INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 115. Governments in Canada can refer questions to
courts in part because of the absence of a case and controversy requirement in the Canadian constitution.
52. R. v. Marshall, (1983) 57 N.S.R. (2d) 286 (Can.).
53. Mackeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796 (Can.).
54. C.J. MCEACHERN, ET AL., REPORT TO THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COMMITTEE (1990),
available at http://cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/conduct_inq_HartJonesMacdonald_ReportIC_199008_
en.pdf. For articles, many that are critical of this decision, see The Symposium, 40 U. NEW BRUNSWICK
L.J. 262 ff. (1991).
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report in a 1991 case that created a broad constitutional right for the
accused to receive disclosure of all relevant and non-privileged
information in the prosecution’s possession.55 The inquiry also
recommended that an appointed Director of Public Prosecution
supervise all prosecutions and that the law school in Nova Scotia
promote the training of both Aboriginal and African-Canadian
minorities, both reforms that were subsequently implemented. The
inquiry also recommended that an independent review mechanism be
available to re-investigate alleged cases of wrongful convictions, but this
recommendation has not been implemented.
B. The Wrongful Conviction of Tammy Marquardt
Tammy Marquardt, a twenty-one year-old woman and single mother,
was convicted of murder in 1995 for killing her two and one-half year
old son. Her son had a history of epileptic seizures and had, at
Marquardt’s request, temporarily been placed in the custody of child
welfare officials. Marquardt consistently denied killing her son.
Marquardt’s lawyer attempted to question prospective jurors about
whether they might be prejudiced by the allegations of child killing, but
the trial judge did not allow such questions to be put to prospective
jurors, concluding that he was “not persuaded that there is a reasonable
potential for the existence of partiality in the minds of the proposed
jurors based upon all of the material before the court including the very
nature of the charge itself.”56 Potential jurors are not as readily
questioned in Canada as in the United States about whether they may be
biased against the accused.
The main evidence at trial against Marquardt came from the
testimony of Dr. Charles Smith, a pathologist who testified that the
cause of her son’s death was asphyxia and cited petechial haemorrhages
and brain swelling as evidence in support of his opinion.57 The defence
called no medical evidence to challenge this testimony, but argued that
the child’s death might have been caused by an epileptic seizure.
Forensic pathologists subsequently found flaws in Dr. Smith’s work
in this, and other child death cases. They found his work flawed in
twenty of forty child death cases that they reviewed, and a subsequent
55. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
56. R. v. Marquardt (1995), 44 C.R. (4th). 4th 353, ¶ 910 (Ont.Ct. (Gen.Div.)).
57. Dr. Smith testified “his findings were “consistent with” suffocation with a soft object, a
pillow, a plastic bag or if someone held his nose and mouth closed and he was suffocated that way. He
discounted seizure as a cause of death as he had no evidence “of that at all.” In particular, he testified
that “you don’t have evidence of asphyxia” from sudden and unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP).
However, he allowed that he was not an expert on this condition and the opinion of a pediatric
neurologist would be better than his opinion on that issue. R. v. Marquardt, 2011 ONCA 281, ¶ 9 (Can.).
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inquiry found that Smith’s work was not adequately supervised, and
frequently not subject to adequate adversarial challenge in court. In
Marquardt’s case, the reviewing forensic pathologists found that
asphyxia was not supported in the evidence as the cause of death, which
in their view was unascertained, with a fatal epileptic seizure not being
excluded. The inquiry also found that Dr. Smith saw his role as
supporting the prosecution, as opposed to providing impartial expert
evidence. Dr. Smith also made inappropriate references to his personal
experience and irrelevant, but prejudicial, factors about the families of
deceased children and used inappropriate language when he testified.58
Marquardt appealed her conviction to the Ontario Court of Appeal,
but the appeal was dismissed in 1998. The appeal did not challenge Dr.
Smith’s evidence but rather suggested that the trial judge erred by not
relating the evidence to a possible manslaughter verdict. This ground of
appeal implicitly suggested that Marquardt might be guilty, but should
have been convicted of a lesser form of homicide. This feature of both
the Marquardt and Marshall cases suggests that defence lawyers may not
have been as attentive to their client’s claims of innocence as they
should. As in the Marshall case, the manslaughter argument raised by
Marquardt’s lawyer on appeal was not successful, with the court of
appeal correctly stressing that the only defence raised at trial was that
her son died through natural causes or accident.59
In a number of other cases involving Dr. Smith, parents accepted plea
bargains to lesser forms of homicides to avoid the mandatory sentence
of life imprisonment that follows a murder conviction in Canada.60 Both
with respect to guilty pleas and appeals, the Canadian criminal justice
system does not provide sufficient protections for accused to persist in
58. GOUDGE INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 162, 183, 188.
59. The Court of Appeal concluded that the manslaughter “verdict was tenuous . . . . The only
defence advanced at trial was accident. The trial judge properly directed the jury that if they had a
reasonable doubt that the death was accidental, the appellant was entitled to an acquittal. The appellant,
in her extensive and detailed testimony, gave no evidence capable of supporting a manslaughter verdict
either on the basis of a loss of control or excessive use of force to quiet the child. The appellant denied
being angry, denied being under any special stress due to her relationship with her husband, denied any
need to discipline the child, denied having had a black-out, in short denied being in any kind of mental
state that would support a lack of intent. There was no other physical or circumstantial evidence to
suggest that the appellant lacked the requisite intent at the time of the death. On the other hand, the
medical and other evidence strongly suggested at least an intent to cause bodily harm that the appellant
knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether death ensued or not. It was sufficient that the
intent and the act of suffocation coincided at some point.” R. v. Marquardt, (1998) 124 C.C.C. 3d 375, ¶
6–7 (Can.).
60. For examples of guilty pleas being subsequently overturned in cases involving Dr. Smith see
R. v. Sheratt Robinson, 2009 ONCA 886 (Can.); R. v. C.F., 2010 ONCA 691 (Can.); R. v. C.M., 2010
ONCA 690 (Can.); R. v. Kumar, 2011 ONCA 120 (Can.); R. v. Brant, 2011 ONCA 362 (Can.) (parents
pled guilty to reduced homicide in the child’s death in the face of forensic pathology evidence later
shown to be unreliable).
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claims of innocence. Both Marshall and Marquardt would have spent
less time in jail if they had pled guilty to manslaughter, even though
both were innocent. In some respects, the Canadian criminal justice
system penalizes accused for persisting in claims of innocence.
Marquardt never appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada because
she had been denied legal aid funding. In 2009, after the revelations and
inquiry into Dr. Smith, she appealed to the Supreme Court with notice of
fresh evidence relating to the unreliability of Dr. Smith’s testimony at
trial. In a short summary judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada
granted the leave to appeal out of time and remanded the case to the
Ontario Court of Appeal to consider the fresh evidence. The prosecution
did not oppose this motion.61
A judge of the court of appeal granted Marquardt bail, pending the
hearing of appeal, thus releasing her from thirteen years of
imprisonment.62 In 2011, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the
fresh medical evidence and found that it “shows that Dr. Smith made
several significant errors that could have misled the jury and led to a
miscarriage of justice.”63 The errors included finding asphyxia on the
basis of non-specific petechial haemorrhages and stating that the
autopsy excluded epilepsy as a cause of death. The court of appeal held
that in light of the new evidence, the conviction was a miscarriage of
justice. It did not acquit Marquardt, but instead ordered a new trial, in
part because it did not accept expert testimony that epilepsy was the
cause of death, as it was outside the scope of expertise of two pediatric
neurologists who gave portions of the fresh evidence.64 The Crown
subsequently withdrew the murder charge with the trial judge expressing
regret for what had happened.65 The government has offered $250,000
in compensation,66 but Marquardt is understandably seeking more, given
both her thirteen years in prison and her loss of contact with two other
sons who the state subsequently put up for adoption after she was
wrongfully convicted.

61. Tammy Marie Marquardt v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2009 Can LII 21729 (SCC), available
at http://canlii.ca/t/23dkg.
62. She was granted parole at one time, but it was subsequently revoked.
63. Marquardt, 2011 ONCA 281, ¶ 16.
64. Id. ¶ 21.
65. Tracey Tyler, Murder Charges Withdrawn Against Mother Wrongfully Convicted of Killing
Son, 2, TORONTO STAR, June 7, 2011, available at http://www.thestar.com/news/crime/2011/06/07/
murder_charges_withdrawn_against_mother_wrongfully_convicted_of_killing_son_2.html.
66. Kevin Connor, Wrongfully Accused Mom to Get $250,000, OTTAWA SUN, Aug. 11, 2010,
available at http://www.ottawasun.com/news/Canada/2010/08/10/14982991.html.
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IV. THE LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR OVERTURNING OLD CONVICTIONS
ON THE BASIS OF NEW EVIDENCE
The above case studies represent the two major methods for
overturning wrongful convictions in Canada. In Marshall’s case, a new
appeal was ordered as a result of a petition to the federal Minister of
Justice and Marshall was granted bail pending that appeal. In
Marquardt’s case, the Supreme Court granted an appeal out of time and
remanded the case back to the Ontario Court of Appeal to hear fresh
evidence. Marquardt was granted bail pending this appeal which
considered the fresh evidence and overturned a conviction. The Court of
Appeal ordered a new trial but the prosecutor withdrew the charge.
Canadian courts are relatively generous in allowing both appeals out
of time and new evidence to be admitted, especially in cases where the
prosecutor consents to such procedures. This procedure has been used
with the prosecutor’s consent to reverse convictions, often from guilty
pleas, in a series of child death cases where new evidence demonstrated
that the conviction based on the evidence of pathologist Charles Smith
was flawed. Although due diligence is a formal prerequisite for the
admission of new evidence, Canadian courts have consistently held that
this requirement should not stand in the way of a correction of a
miscarriage of justice.
Another important mechanism for recognizing wrongful convictions
in Canada is the ability of courts to grant bail to a person pending a new
appeal or even pending a petition to the Minister of Justice to order a
new trial or a new appeal.67 For many of the wrongly convicted in
Canada, such bail decisions are their first breath of freedom and their
first official recognition that they have been wrongfully convicted.
A. Appeals
Canada has a unitary criminal court system, but one that has fairly
wide appeal rights that can assist in the overturning of wrongful
convictions. The accused has a right to appeal to the provincial court of
appeal on any ground that raises a question of law alone. The accused
can also appeal questions of mixed law and fact and other matters with
the leave of the court of appeal, which generally hears appeals in panels
67. Bail pending appeal is governed by s.679 of the Criminal Code and can be ordered in cases
where the ground of appeal is not frivolous and detention is not necessary in the public interest. For an
example of the use of this power in a miscarriage of justice case see R. v. Parsons, (1997) 124
C.C.C.(3d), 92 (Can. Nfld. C.A.). For examples of bail being granted pending the Minister of Justice’s
decision whether to re-open a case and order a new trial or a new appeal see R. v. Phillion, [2003] O.J.
No. 3422 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. of Just.); R. v. Driskell, 2004 MBQB 3 (Can.); R. v. Unger, 2005 MBQB
238 (Can.); Ostrowski v. The Queen et al., 2009 MBQB 327 (Can.).
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of three judges.68 The appeal court can assign publicly funded counsel to
assist in the appeal when it is desirable in the interests of justice.69 The
accused has a right to an additional appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada on any question of law on which an appeal court judge
dissents.70 The Supreme Court can also hear appeals on matters of
national importance, but denies the vast majority of such applications
without written reasons. Various rules of courts provide time limits for
the accused to give notice of appeal, but appeal courts have a statutory
right to extend time71 and have done so after decades of delay in cases
where the accused presents fresh evidence as a reason for a delayed
appeal. In cases involving possible wrongful convictions, appeal courts
have also granted their discretion to hear moot appeals involving dead
accused.72 Canada does not have a tradition found in the United States of
statutes of limitations barring appeals or the admission of fresh
evidence.
The court of appeal can allow an appeal from the conviction on the
basis of 1) legal error that is not harmless73 or 2) the conviction is
unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence or 3) any ground
that there was a miscarriage of justice.74 The Ontario Court of Appeal
has characterized the accused’s appeal rights, combined with the power
to admit fresh evidence and hear evidence from witnesses under s.683 of
the Criminal Code “in the interests of justice,” as “broad rights of
appeal.” It has stated that “the broad rights of appeal, the power to
receive fresh evidence, and the court’s wide remedial powers are all
designed to maximize protection against wrongful convictions.”75 This
statement was made in the course of a ruling in which the accused
sought disclosure of material related to Dr. Smith, a pathologist whose
faulty work led to the appointment of the Goudge Inquiry and the
recognition of a number of wrongful convictions. The Supreme Court
68. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46 s.675.
69. Id. s.684. Neither this section nor the Charter provides an automatic right to have assistance
of state funded counsel. R. v. Robinson, (1989), 51 C.C.C.3d 452 (Alta.C.A.); R. v. Baig (1990), 58
C.C.C.3d 156 (B.C.C.A.), leave refused 60 C.C.C.3d vi (S.C.C.).
70. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, s.691.
71. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, s.678.
72. R. v. Smith, 2004 SCC 14, ¶47 (Can.) (discussing R. v. Jette, (1999) 141 C.C.C.3d 52 (Can.
Que. C.A.) in which an appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings entered in a case where fresh
evidence was admitted suggesting that the accused’s statements had been extracted involuntarily and
that perjured testimony about the accused making an incriminating statement to an informant had been
introduced at trial).
73. In what is commonly called “the proviso,” the Court of Appeal can dismiss an appeal under
s.686(1)(b)(iii) in cases where, even though the trial judge made an error of law, the Court of Appeal “is
of the opinion that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred.”
74. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, s.686(1)(b)(iii).
75. R. v. Trotta (2004), 23 C.R. (6th) 261, ¶ 24 (Ont. C.A.).
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eventually ordered a new trial in the Trotta case, despite the Crown’s
argument that a conviction could be sustained without Dr. Smith’s
testimony given the pattern of child abuse. The Supreme Court held that
it was:
[N]either safe nor sound to conclude that the verdicts on any of the
charges would necessarily have been the same but for Dr. Smith’s
successfully impugned evidence. To attempt at this stage to insulate the
effect of Dr. Smith’s evidence on one count from its possible effect on
the others would amount to an unwarranted exercise in appellate
speculation.76

The Court ordered a new trial, but one of the accused was convicted of
manslaughter at the retrial. The Supreme Court’s concern about the
safety of the first guilty verdict may respond to criticisms that, unlike in
Britain or Australia, the Canadian Criminal Code does not specifically
authorize appeals due to concerns about the safety of verdicts.
Justice Kaufman, in his commission of inquiry report on the Guy Paul
Morin case, recommended that consideration should be given to
changing the powers of the court of appeal so that they could “set aside
a conviction where [there exists] a ‘lurking doubt’ as to[] guilt . . . .”77
He found that appellate courts implicitly, and in a few cases explicitly,
considered the safety of verdicts when determining whether a conviction
was reasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence. He stressed the
following:
[A]n appellate court can overestimate the importance of seeing or hearing
the witnesses. A substantial part of credibility is the internal consistency
of a witnesses’ testimony (however well or badly that witness presents)
and its consistency with other known facts. If the record produces a
lurking doubt or a sense of disquiet about the verdict of guilt, should an
appellate court not be empowered to act upon that sense after fully
articulating those aspects of the record that have produced that doubt? No
doubt, many appellate judges who sense a potential injustice do this—
sometimes indirectly—through their determination of whether there was a
legal error at trial. With respect, a disquieting conviction may compel an
appeal to be allowed on the most esoteric misdirection relating to a point
of law that only legal scholars might appreciate. It is well arguable that a
slightly broadened scope for appellate intervention permits the Court to
do directly what some judges now do indirectly. It recognizes the most
important, though not exclusive, function of a criminal appellate court: to
76. R. v. Trotta, 2007 SCC 49, ¶ 14(Can.). This decision reversed an earlier one of the Ontario
Court of Appeal that had upheld the conviction on the basis that “there was cogent, if not overwhelming,
evidence that Paolo was a battered child and that Marco was his abuser.” R. v. Trotta, (2004), 190.
C.C.C. (3d) 199, ¶ 31 (Can.) and on the basis that the Crown had provided overwhelming evidence that
the child was abused during his eight month life and that “there will never be a perfect trial.” Id. at ¶ 98.
77. MORIN INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 1176.
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ensure that no person is convicted of a crime that he or she did not
commit.78

Despite this recommendation, s.686 of the Criminal Code has not been
amended to allow convictions to be reversed on the basis of a lurking
doubt or even the British ground of safety, though courts of appeal
continue, as in the Trotta case, to make reference to the safety of
convictions.
In R. v. Biniaris,79 the Supreme Court was asked to adopt the lurking
doubt standard. In that case, the Court upheld a murder conviction, even
though the Crown pathologist changed her testimony after having
consulted with the defence pathologists to the effect that the accused’s
actions in stomping on the deceased did not cause the victim’s death.
Justice Arbour for the Court rejected the lurking doubt standard, stating:
It is insufficient for the court of appeal to refer to a vague unease, or a
lingering or lurking doubt based on its own review of the evidence. This
“lurking doubt” may be a powerful trigger for thorough appellate scrutiny
of the evidence, but it is not, without further articulation of the basis for
such doubt, a proper basis upon which to interfere with the findings of a
jury. In other words, if, after reviewing the evidence at the end of an
error-free trial which led to a conviction, the appeal court judge is left
with a lurking doubt or feeling of unease, that doubt, which is not in itself
sufficient to justify interfering with the conviction, may be a useful signal
that the verdict was indeed reached in a non-judicial manner. In that case,
the court of appeal must proceed further with its analysis.80

The Court did, however, state that appellate courts should examine
convictions “through the lens of judicial experience which serves as an
additional protection against an unwarranted conviction.”81 The Court
also indicated that an appellate court could overturn a conviction as
unreasonable on the basis of a mix of objective and subjective factors.
Appellate courts are more likely to find convictions unreasonable in
the majority of Canadian cases where a judge alone tries the accused and
the appeal court can review the trial judge’s reasons for convicting,82 as
78. Id. at 1187–88.
79. 2000 SCC 15.
80. Id. at ¶ 38.
81. Id. at ¶ 40.
82. Compare, R. v. Burke, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 474 (Can.) (reversing a historical indecent assault
conviction on the basis of the judge’s reasoning), with R. v. Francois, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 827 (Can.)
(upholding a historical rape conviction rendered by a jury). The Supreme Court has recently affirmed
that judge’s verdicts will be subject to more searching reasonableness review because “judges, unlike
juries, give reasons for their findings which the appellate court may review and consider as part of its
reasonableness analysis. However, this expanded reasonableness review entered by trial judges do not
apply to reasonableness review of a jury verdict.” R. v. W.H., 2013 SCC 23, ¶ 26. The differences of
appellate review of judges alone and jury convictions was narrowed in R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5
(Can.) where the majority of the Court upheld a judge alone conviction stressing that the issue was
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opposed to the minority of cases in Canada which are tried before a
judge and jury.83 The Supreme Court has confirmed its deference to jury
verdicts when it recently held that an appellate court had erred in
reversing a jury’s conviction in a historical sexual assault because of the
judges’ concerns about inconsistencies in the complainant’s account of
the case. The Court specifically warned that the reviewing court must
not “act as a ‘13th juror’ or simply give effect to vague unease or lurking
doubt based on its own review of the written record or find that a verdict
is unreasonable simply because the reviewing court had a reasonable
doubt based on its review of the record.”84 The Court recognized that
“appellate review for unreasonableness of guilty verdict is a powerful
safeguard against wrongful convictions” but nevertheless insisted that it
“must be exercised with great deference to the fact-finding role of the
jury. Trial by jury must not become trial by appellate court on the
written record.”85
Another ground for allowing appeals from convictions is “on any
ground that there was a miscarriage of justice.” “In every case, if the
reviewing court concludes that the error, whether procedural or
substantive, led to a denial of a fair trial, the court may properly
characterize the matter as one where there was a miscarriage of
justice.”86 In such cases a new trial is the minimal remedy that the
appellate court must order. There may also be a miscarriage of justice
where the trial judge misapprehended evidence on matters of substance
rather than detail, but only if such matters are material to the verdicts
and the error plays “an essential part not just in the narrative of the
judgment but ‘in the reasoning process resulting in a conviction.’”87
The miscarriage of justice ground for allowing an appeal is of
particular importance in cases where new evidence is admitted on
appeal. In its Truscott Reference,88 the Ontario Court of Appeal
commented that on appeals that consider fresh evidence:
[S]ection 686(1)(a)(iii) is the only provision that is potentially relevant. It
allows an appellate court to grant an appeal ‘on any ground there was a
whether the conviction was reasonable, not the trial judge’s reasons. This case is a step backward in
overturning wrongful convictions because as the minority emphasized it is dangerous to uphold a
conviction based on bad or illogical reasoning.
83. Accused in Canada only have a constitutional right under s.11(f) of the Charter to be tried
before a jury if they face five years imprisonment or more and even in such circumstances most accused
elect under the Criminal Code to be tried by judge alone. See M.L. Friedland & Kent Roach, Borderline
Justice: Choosing Juries in the Two Niagaras, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 120 (1997).
84. R. v. W.H., 2013 SCC 22 at para 27. (Can.).
85. Id. at ¶ 32.
86. R. v. Khan, 2001 SCC 86, ¶ 27 (Can.).
87. R. v. Loher, 2004 SCC 80, ¶ 2 (Can.).
88. 2007 ONCA 575 (Can.).
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miscarriage of justice’. This power can reach virtually any kind of error
that renders the trial unfair in a procedural or substantive way. The
section has been applied on appeals where there was no unfairness at
trial, but evidence was admitted on appeal that placed the reliability of
the conviction in serious doubt. In these cases, the miscarriage of justice
lies not in the conduct of the trial or even the conviction as entered at
trial, but rather in maintaining the conviction in the face of new evidence
that renders the conviction factually unreliable.89

Appeals on grounds of miscarriages of justice in Canada thus allow
convictions to be quashed both on the basis that the trial was not fair and
on the basis that new evidence places the reliability of the conviction in
serious doubt. This decision demonstrates the flexibility of the legal
term miscarriage of justice and its ability to include, but not be limited
to, cases of factual innocence.
The most common grounds of appeal are not, however, that the
verdict is unreasonable or constitutes a miscarriage of justice, but rather
that trial judges erred in law in either their reasons or instructions to
juries. Even if an appeal court finds an error of law, it can sustain a
conviction if it concludes “no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice
has occurred.”90 In other words, the trial judge’s errors of law can be
held to be harmless to the guilty verdict. The proviso at least requires the
appellate court to address its mind to the question of whether there has
been a miscarriage of justice. The proviso or harmless error rule can be
applied to even major errors of law, but “only if it is clear that the
evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused is so overwhelming that
any other verdict but a conviction would be impossible.”91 A new trial
should be ordered after a finding of an error of law unless there is no
reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different.92 In
cases where the error of law was the exclusion of exculpatory evidence,
any reasonable effect that the evidence could have had on the jury
should be considered.93 In cases where the error of law was the inclusion
of inadmissible evidence, the appeal should be allowed and a new trial
ordered if there is any possibility that a trial judge would have had a
reasonable doubt about the accused’s guilt on the basis of the admissible
evidence.94
In a recent case, the Supreme Court split 5-4 and held that the trial
judge’s admission of prejudicial investigative hearsay without a limiting

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at ¶ 110.
Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s.686(1)(b)(iii).
Khan, 2001 SCC 86, ¶ 31.
R. v. Bevan, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599 (Can.).
R. v. Wildman, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 311 (Can.).
R. v. S (P.L.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 909 (Can.).
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instruction to the jury was a harmless error in a case where the accused
alleged that the police had inadequately investigated an alternative
hypothesis that loan sharks had attempted to murder the victim. The
majority held that the admission of the investigating officer’s opinion
that the accused was guilty did not result in a substantial wrong or
miscarriage of justice. In contrast, the dissenting judges concluded that
the Crown had not discharged its onus that there was no reasonable
possibility that the legal error did not make a difference to the outcome
of the case.95 Unfortunately, the Court did not advert to American
studies finding that appeal courts had found legal errors to be harmless
in 38% of cases of DNA exonerees.96 There is a danger that appeals are
not as effective as they should be in detecting wrongful convictions.
The prosecutor in Canada can appeal an acquittal, but only on the
basis that the acquittal was based on an error of law.97 In at least one
case, a prosecutor’s successful appeal from an acquittal resulted in a
wrongful conviction. In that case, the Crown successfully appealed Guy
Paul Morin’s original acquittal of murder on the basis that the trial judge
had erred in law by inviting the jury to apply the reasonable doubt
standard to each piece of evidence.98 The Commission of Inquiry into
Morin’s wrongful conviction recommended that the Criminal Code be
amended to require the Crown to demonstrate that the verdict likely
would have been different had the trial judge not made the error of
law.99 The Supreme Court has subsequently held that an error of law
must be reasonably thought to have a material bearing on the acquittal.
That said, the prosecutor does not have to establish that the verdict
would necessarily have been different to receive an order for a new trial
after a successful prosecutorial appeal from an acquittal.100 The
relatively broad appeal rights enjoyed by accused in Canada are
balanced by the ability of the prosecutors to appeal acquittals.
B. Fresh Evidence on Appeal
Section 683 of the Criminal Code provides courts of appeal with
broad powers to consider fresh evidence. The court of appeal can also
order production of things and provide for the examination and cross-

95. R. v. Van, 2009 SCC 22 (Can.).
96. BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 201 (2011) (involving 62 of 165 cases
with written decisions); See also Brandon Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 108
(2008) (an earlier study finding 32% of exonerees).
97. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s.676.
98. R. v. Morin, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345 (Can.).
99. MORIN INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 1188.
100. R. v. Graveline, 2006 SCC 16 (Can.).
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examination of witnesses before the court of appeal or other body. The
test for the admission of fresh evidence is that the evidence must:
(1) bear on a decisive or potentially decisive issue;
(2) the evidence must be credible;
(3) the evidence, if believed, could affect the result; and
(4) the evidence should generally not have been obtainable at trial by due
diligence.101

Courts have consistently held that the due diligence requirement
should not be applied as strictly in criminal as in civil cases. The
Supreme Court made clear that the due diligence requirement was not
essential and must yield where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result.102 In a recent case, the Supreme Court allowed the accused to
admit as fresh evidence a forensic dentist’s opinion that an injury to an
accused convicted of sexual assault was not a bite mark, even though the
accused conceded that the new evidence could have been obtained by
due diligence at trial. The Court stressed that “it would be unsafe to
uphold the convictions” given the closeness of the case and the fact that
a police officer was allowed at trial to provide his opinion that the injury
was the result of a bite mark.103
The court of appeal can also appoint a special commissioner to
inquire and report back on matters, including scientific matters that
cannot “conveniently be inquired into before the court of appeal.”104
This provision is an interesting inquisitorial aspect of the appellate
process in Canada that has been used in at least one wrongful conviction
case.105 The addition of inquisitorial aspects to the adversary system
could in some cases help prevent or remedy wrongful convictions by
demonstrating an official commitment that the state should take efforts
to discover the truth.106
C. DNA
DNA has played a decisive role in revealing many wrongful
convictions in Canada, particularly those involving hair analysis and
sexual assault or murder. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court
of Canada, in holding that it would be unconstitutional to extradite a
person without assurances that the death penalty would not be applied,
101. Manhas v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 591 (Can.).
102. G.D.B, 2000 SCC 22, ¶ 37.
103. R. v. J.A.A, [2011] 1 S.C.R 628, ¶14(Can.).
104. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s.683(1)(e).
105. R. v. Nepoose, [1992] 125 A.R. 28, 29 (Can.).
106. Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Themes, 35 N.C. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 387, 430–32 (2010).
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has rightly stressed that DNA will not be available in many potential
wrongful conviction cases.107 DNA evidence can reveal flaws in the
criminal justice system that result in wrongful convictions, but it is not a
panacea for the problems of wrongful convictions.
The Criminal Code allows judges to grant warrants to obtain DNA
samples and to collect DNA samples from an expanding list of
convicted offenders.108 There are provisions that limit the use of such
DNA samples to the investigation of designated offences and that
provide for destruction of the DNA sample after an acquittal or
dismissal of charges.109 The focus of this legislation and the DNA data
bank containing over 200,000 convicted offender profiles and over
65,000 crime scene profiles110 is on crime control though it may also
preserve DNA evidence that will be critical in revealing wrongful
convictions.
There are no specific provisions in the DNA legislation, as there are
in the American Innocence Protection Act,111 that provide for a person
who has been convicted to have access to DNA samples. At the same
time, an appeal court under s.683(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code
could order the production of DNA material as evidence relating to
proceedings, and trial judges would likely have similar powers. In many
cases, prosecutors consent to the testing of evidence that may contain
DNA. Disputes and delays do occur and they can delay the discovery of
wrongful convictions.
The Morin Inquiry recommended that protocols for DNA testing be
developed between prosecutors and defence lawyers and that material be
retained for such testing. The inquiry also approved of the development
of a national DNA data bank, but did not recommend statutory
entitlement to DNA testing for those claiming to be wrongly
convicted.112 The Milgaard Inquiry found that the RCMP lab missed
discovering DNA material that could have led to Milgaard being more
quickly exonerated for murder.113
The lack of specific statutory regulation of post-conviction DNA
testing is another example of statutes in Canada failing to make
107. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, ¶ 109 (quoting Peter Neufeld’s testimony to Congress).
108. Criminal Code ss.487.04-487.0911(Can.).
109. Criminal Code ss.487.08-487.09 (Can.).
110. The labs that process DNA are run by the RCMP with separate provincial forensic science
labs in the largest provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The data bank provides statistics on over 19,000
offender hits but not on whether the bank has ever produced exonerations. See National DNA Data
Bank, ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, http://www.nddb-bndg.org/images/stats_e.pdf (last visited
Nov. 7, 2011).
111. Pub L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 13701).
112. MORIN INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 395–96.
113. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 808–11.
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adequate acknowledgement of the possibility of wrongful convictions. It
may also demonstrate a faith that unelected prosecutors will generally
consent to DNA testing or that judges will exercise their powers,
including those relating to the admission of fresh evidence on appeal, to
ensure that evidence that may contain DNA will be tested. Some
commentators have argued that Canadians have historically
demonstrated greater trust of those who hold state power than
Americans114 and this may help explain the lack of a statutory
entitlement to DNA evidence that is provided in most American
jurisdictions.
D. Appellate Discretion to Enter an Acquittal or to Order a New Trial
If the accused is successful on the appeal, the appellate court has
discretion to enter an acquittal or to order a new trial. The choice
between these two remedies can have a profound effect on the
wrongfully convicted. An acquittal means that the accused has been
found not guilty and the presumption of innocence has been restored,
whereas a new trial order may either place the accused in continued
jeopardy or result in a prosecutorial stay of proceedings, which may
produce residual stigma in the case of an accused who has previously
been convicted.
There is a long but not invariable practice of entering acquittals in
cases where the accused likely suffered a miscarriage of justice. The
Manitoba Court of Appeal entered an acquittal after Thomas
Sophonow’s third trial, in part because he had already faced three trials
and served close to four years in jail, and because the identification
evidence in the case was not reliable.115 In R. v. Hinse, the Supreme
Court of Canada set aside a stay of proceedings the Quebec Court of
Appeal entered in a case of a thirty-year-old wrongful robbery
conviction. It entered an acquittal on the basis that the “evidence could
not allow a reasonable jury properly instructed to find the appellant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”116 In Re Truscott, the Ontario Court
of Appeal held that while it might normally order a new trial, an
acquittal was appropriate given that a new trial on the 1959 murder was
not possible, a prosecutorial stay would impose continuing stigma on
Truscott, and it was more probable than not that Truscott would be
acquitted at a hypothetical new trial.117
114. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE (1990); DAVID JONES AND DAVID
KILGOUR UNEASY NEIGHBORS (2007).
115. R. v. Sophonow, (1985) 38 Man. R. 2d 198, 202 (C.A.).
116. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 3, ¶ 2.
117. Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA 575, ¶ 265.
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In other miscarriages of justice cases, courts of appeal have been able
to conclude that an acquittal should be entered because no reasonable
jury would convict the accused. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal in
R. v. Walsh, after hearing new evidence from a variety of witnesses and
examining archival material that should have been disclosed to an
accused who had served twenty-seven years imprisonment on a murder
charge, entered an acquittal. It stressed that the prosecutor had agreed
that the fresh evidence should be admitted, that there was a miscarriage
of justice, and that a new trial was not feasible.118 The Court of Appeal
concluded that:
[I]n view of the fact we have a complete record, we have considered the
entire case as it was presented to the judge and jury. We have also
considered the fresh evidence. On the evidence as it now stands, the trial
record as augmented by the fresh evidence, we are of the opinion that no
reasonable jury could convict Walsh of murder.119

In the William Mullins-Johnson case, an acquittal was also entered,
with the agreement of the Crown, after the court of appeal had
considered fresh pathological evidence indicating that the cause of the
death of Mullins-Johnson’s niece was undetermined and that the
medical evidence did not support the original conviction of murder and
sexual assault.120
The practice of entering acquittals is not invariable. The Ontario
Court of Appeal refused to enter an acquittal when overturning a 1972
murder conviction in Phillion’s case. The court of appeal stated that a
new trial was necessary because “depending on how the fresh evidence
were to unfold at a new trial, it would be open to a jury to reject the
defence of alibi and conclude, essentially on the basis of the appellant’s
confessions,” that the accused was guilty. It concluded that “substituting
a verdict of acquittal on the basis that the fresh evidence is ‘clearly
decisive’ of innocence is not a tenable position.”121 Phillion had not
established under the Truscott test that it was more probable than not

118. Re Walsh, 2008 NBCA 33, ¶ 96 (Can.).
119. Id., ¶ 91.
120. Re Mullins-Johnson, 2007 ONCA 720 (Can.). For other wrongful convictions stemming
from Dr. Smith’s flawed forensic pathology testimony where the Court of Appeal entered an acquittal,
see R. v. Sheratt Robinson, 2009 ONCA 886 (Can.); R. v. C.F., 2010 ONCA 691 (Can.); R. v. C.M.,
2010 ONCA 690 (Can.); R. v. Kumar, 2011 ONCA 120 (Can.); R. v. Brant, 2011 ONCA 362 (Can.).
For a historical case in which the prosecutor conceded that “Given the Crown’s submissions, it is open
to the Court to conclude that as matters stand today, no reasonable jury could convict. In the event that
such determination is made, the appropriate remedy is to enter acquittals on the counts at bar.” R. v.
Henry 2010 BCCA 462, ¶ 10 (Can.). For another wrongful conviction involving a mistaken
identification where the prosecutor consented to the entry of an acquittal see R. v. Webber, 2010 ONCA
4 (Can.).
121. Re Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202, ¶ 244 (Can.).
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that he would be acquitted at a hypothetical new trial, even though there
was new alibi evidence that “may well have left the jury in a state of
reasonable doubt . . . ”.122 One judge dissented in this appeal, and would
have upheld the conviction. As in Truscott, a new trial was impossible
given the age of the events and the prosecutor subsequently decided to
withdraw the charge. As discussed above, the Ontario Court of Appeal
refused to enter an acquittal when it overturned Marquardt’s murder
conviction, though the prosecutor subsequently withdrew the murder
charges.
E. Prosecutorial Conduct at New Trials
If a new trial, as opposed to an acquittal, is ordered in a case of a
suspected miscarriage of justice, the prosecutor has the option of 1)
conducting a new trial, or 2) issuing a prosecutorial stay of proceedings,
3) withdrawing charges, or 4) of calling no evidence. The previously
convicted person only receives a formal acquittal if no evidence is
called. Prosecutors have been surprisingly reluctant to follow this
approach. In many miscarriage of justice cases, they have simply stayed
proceedings. In response to recent criticisms of this practice, the more
recent trend is towards withdrawing charges.
The Lamer Inquiry concluded that a prosecutorial stay “may leave an
impression with the public that the charge is merely being ‘postponed’
or ‘the authorities,’ in a broad sense, still believe in the validity of the
charge. That impression is likely to be magnified where, as in this case,
the accused had already been convicted and spent years in prison prior
to his successful appeal.”123 Similarly, the Driskell Inquiry expressed
concerns that a prosecutorial stay leaves “a residual stigma” and is not
an appropriate remedy when the Minister of Justice has ordered a new
trial under the petition procedure. It recommended that the preferable
course in most cases of a suspected miscarriage of justice is for the
prosecutor to call no evidence so that the accused receives an acquittal
and is protected by double jeopardy provisions from further
prosecutions for the alleged offence. Prosecutorial stays should only be
entered by the Attorney General personally and if there is still an active
investigation of the formally convicted person.124 A third commission of
inquiry recognized that a prosecutorial stay in 1992 in Milgaard’s case
“left him with significant stigma” that was not dispelled until DNA
exonerated him in 1997, but that it was nevertheless a reasonable

122. Id. at ¶ 246.
123. LAMER INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 317–18.
124. DRISKELL INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 129–39.
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decision.125 The Milgaard commission also endorsed the
recommendations of the Driskell Inquiry about the limited use of
prosecutorial stays in cases of suspected miscarriages of justice.
In light of these criticisms, prosecutors have become more reluctant to
enter stays in miscarriages of justice cases. The new trend in cases such
as Marquardt seems to be to withdraw charges, a practice that, like the
stay, does not result in a formal acquittal. The prosecutor similarly
withdrew charges in the Phillion case, discussed above. Phillion
challenged this decision, arguing that he was entitled to an acquittal
once his 1972 murder conviction had been reversed on the basis of new
evidence. The subsequent challenge to the prosecutorial withdrawal
failed, with the judge emphasizing the important role of prosecutorial
discretion.126 In the end, Canadian victims of wrongful convictions may
not always receive a formal acquittal,127 let alone a finding of factual
innocence from the criminal justice system that is formally required for
compensation.
F. Petitions to the Federal Minister of Justice When
Appeals are Exhausted
If a person’s appeals have been exhausted, the only means to re-open
a case is to petition the federal Minister of Justice, who is an elected
official who also serves as the Attorney General of Canada.128 This
power has been used in a number of high profile cases, including that of
Marshall examined above. Nevertheless, it is a second best approach
because the ultimate decision-maker is an elected politician. In addition,
there are frequent delays that accompany the petition process in part
because of the onus it places on the petitioner to present new evidence
and full records of the case and in part because of the investigations that
are conducted to advise the Minister of Justice. The petition process has
the potential to trigger investigative powers that can be exercised by the
Minister of Justice or his or her designate. However, the petitions have
125. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 336.
126. Phillion, 2010 ONSC 1604 (Can.).
127. Kyle Unger was, however, acquitted after the Manitoba prosecutor called no evidence after a
new trial for murder was ordered after DNA revealed that a hair used to convict him did not belong to
Mr. Unger. A previous Manitoba Inquiry had criticized the use of a prosecutorial stay in another case
where hair comparison evidence was refuted by DNA testing. Kyle Unger Acquitted of 1990 Killing,
CBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2009/10/23/mb-ungeracquitted-manitoba.html.
128. Kerry Scullion, Criminal Conviction Review Group, Dept. of Justice, Can., Wrongful
Convictions and the Criminal Conviction Review Process pursuant to Section 696.1 of the Criminal
Code of Canada, 46 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 189 (2004); see also Peter H. Howden,
Judging Errors of Judgment: Accountability, Independence and Vulnerability in a Post-Appellate
Conviction Review Process, 21 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 569 (2002).
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been characterized as adversarial and reactive by the six commissions of
inquiry that have all recommended that the procedure for petitions be
replaced by giving an independent body, similar to the CCRC used in
England and Wales, power to either refer cases for new appeals or new
trials.
The power of the Minister of Justice to re-open a case after appeals
have been exhausted is based on the royal prerogative of mercy. It was
recognized in Canada’s first Criminal Code enacted in 1892, which
provided:
748. If upon any application for the mercy of the Crown on behalf of any
person convicted of an indictable offence, the Minister of Justice
entertains a doubt whether such person ought to have been convicted, he
may, instead of advising Her Majesty to remit or commute the sentence,
after such inquiry as he thinks proper, by an order in writing direct a new
trial at such time and before such court as he may think proper.

In 1955, the provision was re-worded to indicate the Minister could
direct a trial or a new appeal in his discretion, as opposed to cases where
the Minister “entertains a doubt.” The former “doubt” standard both
provided more statutory guidance to the Minister and accorded with
basic principles of criminal justice, which require guilt to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Canada, the provincial attorneys general conduct most criminal
prosecutions, but the Attorney General of Canada has some
prosecutorial responsibilities, for example, with respect to drug and
terrorism prosecutions. In addition, the Attorney General of Canada
prosecutes all offences in Canada’s three northern territories. In
recommending that an independent and permanent commission, such as
the CCRC, replace the petition process, a number of commissions of
inquiry have noted that the federal Minister of Justice is in a perceived
and sometimes real conflict of interest in deciding whether to refer a
criminal conviction back to the courts. The Milgaard Inquiry
documented a lack of transparency in the petition process, which saw
Milgaard’s petition originally denied but then granted after the
intervention of the Prime Minister. As the inquiry detailed, the Prime
Minister and the Minister of Justice both claimed responsibility for
having the petition ultimately granted, underlining a lack of
transparency about how petitions are decided.129
Until amendments in 2002, the petition procedure was explicitly tied
to applications for the mercy of the Crown. The relevant provision
simply granted the Minister the discretion to order a new trial or to refer
the case to the court of appeal either as a new appeal or on specific
129. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 373-376.
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questions. There were no legislated rules to govern the Minister of
Justice’s exercise of discretion. Nevertheless, the courts held there was
some duty of fairness that required the Minister to “conduct a
meaningful review” and provide the occupant with “a reasonable
opportunity to state his case.”130 At the same time, the courts warned
that the petition procedure was not an appeal on the merits, there was no
general right to disclosure of all material the Minister considered in
making his or her decision and that the duty of fairness was less than
applied in judicial proceedings.131 Courts consistently deferred to
Ministerial decisions not to grant petitions.132
In 1994, Minister of Justice Allan Rock announced a number of
principles that guided his decision-making under the petition procedure.
He emphasized that the petition remedy was extraordinary and not
intended to allow the Minister to substitute his opinion for that of the
court or jury or to create a fourth level of appeal. Petitions should
ordinarily be based on new matters that the courts had not considered.
The Minister would assess the reliability and significance of new
evidence the applicant placed before the Minister. Although an applicant
does not have to establish innocence to be successful, the applicant
would have to establish that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred.133
The reactive nature of this enterprise was demonstrated in the Milgaard
Inquiry when it heard the following from a formal federal official:
Q: . . . A convicted person can’t come to you and say “look, I’d like you
to investigate, I’m innocent, I don’t know what went wrong but would
you people please go and investigate this and find out why I was
wrongfully convicted”?
A: We would say to that person “that is not the role of the department or
of the Minister.” Certainly, if you’ve been through the process, sat in on
your trial, heard the evidence, you’re in the best position to identify to us
what it is you say constitutes wrongful – or what the errors were and why
they constitute a miscarriage of justice.
Q: And what you are telling us, then, it would be incumbent upon Mr.
Milgaard and/or his counsel to identify significant grounds that might
provide a basis for a remedy under Section 690?

130. Thatcher v. Canada, [1997] 1 F.C. 289 at 297 [12].
131. Id. at ¶ 12–13.
132. Id.; W.R. v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1999] FC 1059; Bonamy v. Canada, (Att’y Gen.)
2001 FCT 798; Daouluv v. Attorney General, (Canada), 2008 FC 544; Bilodeau v. Minister of Justice,
2008 QCCS 1036, [2008] J.Q.no.2098., affirmed in Bilodeau c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), 2009
QCCA 746, [2009] J.Q. no 3472.
133. Patricia Braiden & Joan Brockman, Remedying Wrongful Convictions Through Applications
to the Minister of Justice Under Section 690 of the Criminal Code, 17 WINDSOR Y.B., ACCESS JUST. 3,
9–10 (1999).
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A: Yes.134

In other words, the Minister of Justice and his or her staff would react
and evaluate new evidence that was put before them by a convicted
person, but they would not conduct proactive investigations to determine
if new evidence, not known to the convicted person, existed.
The 1994 principles established a number of significant hurdles for an
applicant to pass before the Minister of Justice orders that the courts
reconsider a conviction. The first hurdle was to produce new evidence;
the second hurdle was to convince the Minister of Justice that the new
evidence was relevant and reliable and the third hurdle was to convince
the Minister of Justice that an extraordinary remedy of a new trial or
appeal was necessary because a miscarriage of justice likely occurred.
These principles have now largely been codified in the 2002 reforms.
In 2002, the prerogative of mercy provisions were replaced with a
new procedure under ss. 696.1-6 of the Criminal Code. The new
procedures were designed to make the petition process more transparent
by providing the Minister of Justice with legal standards for making his
or her decisions. The most important provision is s. 696.3(3)(a), which
provides that the Minister is to direct a new trial or an appeal “if the
Minister is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a
miscarriage of justice likely occurred.” This standard seems higher than
the comparable English standard. The CCRC will refer a case for a new
appeal if there is “a real possibility” that the conviction would not be
upheld if referred to the court of appeal.135 A reasonable likelihood is a
higher standard than a real possibility. As discussed above, the Canadian
legislation does not define a miscarriage of justice, but courts have
interpreted it in a manner similar to the English standard that focuses on
the safety of convictions as opposed to proven innocence.
Justice Kaufman, in his exhaustive report for the Minister of Justice
in connection with Stephen Truscott’s application under this new
provision, stressed that a miscarriage of justice would occur both if the
conviction of a factually innocent person was established, but also if
new evidence could reasonably have affected the verdict. In the latter
circumstances “it would be unfair to maintain the accused’s conviction
without an opportunity for the trier of fact to consider new evidence.”136
In reversing Truscott’s conviction, the Ontario Court of Appeal
subsequently indicated that a miscarriage of justice would include both
trials that have been unfair and trials “where there was no unfairness at
trial, but evidence was admitted on appeal that placed the reliability of
134. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 358.
135. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995 c 35 s. 13; see also R. v. CCRC ex parte Pearson, [1999] 3 All
E.R. 498 (Can.).
136. F. KAUFMAN, REPORT ON THE STEPHEN TRUSCOTT APPLICATION, ¶ 164 (2004).
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the conviction in serious doubt.”137 In other words, a miscarriage of
justice is a broad term. It can apply to both an unfair trial and a trial
where the factual reliability of the conviction is in doubt.
In deciding whether to re-open a conviction by ordering a new trial or
a new appeal, s. 696.4 instructs that the Minister of Justice shall take
into account all matters that the Minister considers relevant, including:
1. whether the application is supported by new matters of significance
that were not considered by the courts or previously considered by the
Minister in an application in relation to the same conviction or finding
under Part XXIV;
2. the relevance and reliability of information that is presented in
connection with the application; and
3. the fact that an application under this Part is not intended to serve as a
further appeal and any remedy available on such an application is an
extraordinary remedy.

This section codifies many of the principles contained in Minister of
Justice Rock’s 1994 statement. It does not require that new evidence or
new matters be presented, but as a practical matter this is almost always
required, given that the petition procedure is not intended to be a further
level of appeal. Indeed, the federal Department of Justice’s website
presents the need for new matters to be presented as a requirement.138
The internal procedures that are used to decide an application are: (1)
a preliminary assessment to determine whether there are new matters
that provide an air of reality to the claim of a miscarriage of justice; (2)
an investigation in which counsel within the department verifies the
information, collects new information, and makes a recommendation to
the Minister; (3) preparation of an investigative summary that is
disclosed to the applicant for comments; and (4) the preparation of final
legal advice for the Minister of Justice’s decision. There is a special
advisor within the department who offers advice at various stages of the
investigation. The Milgaard Inquiry, however, concluded that the post2002 changes have not changed the “reactive” nature of the process
137. 2007 ONCA 575, ¶ 110 (Can.).
138. “An application for ministerial review must be supported by ‘new matters of significance’—
generally new information that has surfaced since the trial and appeal and therefore has not been
presented to the courts, and has not been considered by the Minister on a prior application. Only after a
thorough review of the new matters of significance will the Minister be in a position to determine
whether there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred.” DEPT. OF
JUST., CAN., ANNUAL REPORT, ADDRESSING POSSIBLE MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/ccr-rc/rep08-rap08/02.html; DEPT. OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT,
APPLICATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL REVIEW—MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/ccr-rc/rep10-rap10/index.html. But for arguments that a conviction will
be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Group within the Department of Justice even if an applicant
does not identify a new matter see Narissa Somji, A Comparative Study of the Post-Conviction Review
Process in Canada and the United Kingdom, 58 Crim. L.Q. 136, 167 (2012).
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because it still relies on the applicant identifying new evidence.139
The 2002 changes allow the Minister of Justice to appoint individuals
to investigate claims of wrongful conviction. Those individuals must be
retired judges, members of the bar, or those with similar qualifications.
They have powers to take evidence, issue subpoenas, and compel people
to give evidence.140 These powers are broad and, unlike the English
CCRC, include a power to obtain documents from private persons.
These delegated authorities, however, only make recommendations to
the Minister of Justice about whether a conviction should be referred
back to the courts and they do not make the actual referral decision.
From November 2002, when the new provisions came into force, to
March 31, 2012, the Minister of Justice has made decisions on eightyseven applications. Most applications were closed after a preliminary
assessment on the basis that there were no grounds for further
investigation. The remaining applications went to investigation, with
thirteen of those cases (15% of total applications) being referred back to
the courts. These statistics suggest that the Minister of Justice refers a
greater percentage of applications (15% compared to 4%) to the courts
than the English CCRC. At the same time, however, the CCRC receives
many more applications each year than the Canadian Minister of
Justice.141
The federal Minister of Justice is more risk adverse than the CCRC in
the cases it decides to refer back to the courts. In twelve of the thirteen
cases that the Minister has referred since 2002, the applicant has
received a favourable remedy resulting in freedom.142 In contrast, over a
third of the cases referred by the CCRC to the court of appeal are not
overturned on appeal. This significant difference could be explained by
a number of factors. One is that the Canadian Minister has to apply a
more difficult standard of a reasonable likelihood that a miscarriage of
139. MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 364.
140. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s.696.2.
141. The Criminal Case Review Commissions receives about 1,000 applications each year
whereas the Canadian Minister of Justice receives about 20 a year. See Graham Zellick, Facing up to
Miscarriages of Justice, 31 Man.L.J. 555, 556 (2006); Narissa Somji, A Comparative Study of the PostConviction Review Process in Canada and the United Kingdom, 58 Crim. L.Q. 136, 188 (2012).
142. The prosecutor stayed proceedings when the Minister ordered a new trial in the cases of
Steven Kaminski (sexual assault); Darcy Bjorge (stolen property); Daniel Wood (murder); James
Driskell (murder); and L.G.P. (sexual assault). The prosecutor withdrew murder charges against Romeo
Phillion. Acquittals were obtained in the cases of Steven Truscott (murder); William Mullins-Johnson
(murder); Andre Tremblay (murder); Erin Walsh (murder); Kyle Unger (murder); and D.R.S (sexual
assault). Rodney Cain, originally convicted of second degree murder, was convicted of manslaughter at
the new trial ordered by the Minister of Justice. See Kent Roach, An Independent Commission to Review
Claims of Wrongful Convictions: Lessons from North Carolina?, 58 Crim. L.Q, 283, 290 (2012). This is
an updated count that includes the recent entry of an acquittal of sexual assault on a Minister of Justice’s
reference in R. v. D.R.S., 2013 ABCA 18. (Can.). The new evidence in this case was a recantation by
the complainant who was nine years old at the time of the allegations.
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justice has occurred, whereas the English CCRC applies a slightly lower
standard of a real possibility that the conviction will not be sustained if a
new appeal is heard. Another possible factor is that the Canadian
Minister is a politician with direct responsibilities for the criminal
justice system, whereas the members of the CCRC are independent
appointees. The many hurdles that the Canadian petition procedure
imposes on applicants results in a much smaller number of applications
than the CCRC model in England and Wales. The Canadian applications
are, however, more likely to be referred back to the courts. In almost
every case where the Minister of Justice makes a referral, the courts or
prosecutors agree that a conviction cannot be maintained. In contrast,
the courts uphold convictions in a significant minority of cases that the
CCRC refers back to the courts.
The 2002 legislation does not provide guidance about how the
Minister of Justice is to decide between ordering a new trial or a new
appeal. In recent years, the Minister of Justice’s preferred remedy is to
refer a case for an appeal, as opposed to a new trial. A new appeal is
especially useful in historical cases, where a new trial is not possible and
will only result in a prosecutorial stay or withdrawal of charges. As
discussed above, appeal courts can consider new evidence and even hear
testimony or appoint special commissioners to inquire into defined
matters. Starting with the 2007 Truscott reference, the courts of appeal
have also been willing to decide whether an acquittal is more probable
than not at a hypothetical new trial and, if so, enter an acquittal. The
trend towards relying on new appeals as opposed to new trials also
mirrors the practice where the CCRC must refer a case to the court of
appeal and is not able to direct a new trial. The Royal Commission on
the Marshall case, however, criticized the use of an appeal remedy
because it places the onus on the accused and could result in a new trial.
At the same time, however, the order of a new trial in a number of
miscarriage of justice cases resulted in prosecutorial stays that, as
discussed above, have been criticized by other inquiries for imposing a
residual stigma on those who have been previously convicted in serious
cases.
There have been many criticisms of the delay in processing petition
applications, which in some cases can take years. Clive Walker and
Kathryn Campbell have concluded that even after the 2002 reforms, the
Canadian petition procedure remains “cumbersome, onerous and
lengthy” and “ultimately ineffective for most wrongly convicted
individuals.”143 In a number of cases, the courts have responded to this
143. Clive Walker & Kathryn Campbell, The CCRC as an Option for Canada: Forwards or
Backwards?, in THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR THE INNOCENT? 191 (M.
Naughton ed., 2010). They conclude that while an independent commission such as the CCRC would be
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delay by granting an applicant bail pending the Minister of Justice’s
final decision.144 This is an important act of judicial creativity to respond
to delays in the petition procedure and the plight of the wrongfully
convicted.145
G. Summary
The two major methods of overturning wrongful convictions in
Canada are the use of appeals, including appeals out of time and appeals
in which fresh evidence is introduced, and petitions to the Minister of
Justice for a new trial or appeal once all appeals have been exhausted.
As outlined above, Canada has a relatively generous appeal structure.
Convictions can be overturned if the guilty verdict was unreasonable,
based on an error of law or if it constitutes a miscarriage of justice
broadly defined to include both unfair and unreliable verdicts. Courts
are also relatively generous in allowing appeals out of time and
accepting fresh evidence on appeal. At the same time, however, the
Canadian courts will not overturn convictions simply because there is a
lurking doubt about guilt. They are more deferential to convictions by
juries than convictions by judges sitting alone. They can also uphold
convictions based on legal error if they determine that the error is
harmless because no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has
occurred.
The second method for overturning convictions is less generous and
more demanding. It requires an applicant who has exhausted all appeals
to convince the Minister of Justice, an elected politician with
responsibility for a minority of all Canadian criminal prosecutions, that
a miscarriage of justice likely has occurred. The Minister of Justice will
only order a new appeal or a new trial as an extraordinary remedy and,
generally, on the basis of new evidence. The Minister of Justice retains
this power despite recommendations by six inquiries that the Minister’s
powers be transferred to an independent commission, as is the case in
England and Wales, Scotland, Norway, and North Carolina.146
Relatively few convicted people apply to the Minister of Justice,
an improvement in Canada, that a Canadian version of the CCRC should play more of a policy and
inspectorate role than the CCRC and take a more holistic approach to the criminal justice system. Id. at
203–04.
144. R. v. Phillion, [2003] O.J. No. 3422 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. of Just.); R. v. Driskell, 2004 MBQB
3 (Can.); R. v. Unger, 2005 MBQB 238 (Can.); Ostrowski v. The Queen et al., 2009 MBQB 327 (Can.).
145. The Criminal Code only explicitly authorizes the grant of bail pending appeal and not
pending a decision of the Minister of Justice under s.696.1-6. See Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46 s.679.
146. See generally Kent Roach, The Role of Innocence Commissions, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89
(2010).
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perhaps because of the difficulty of producing new evidence that will
satisfy the Minister. It can take years for the Minister to make a
decision, especially if there is an investigation. Fortunately, the courts
have mitigated the effects of this delay in some cases by granting
applicants bail pending the Minister’s decision. The Minister of Justice
refers about 15% of all applications back to the courts, either for a new
trial or a new appeal. The Minister of Justice is quite risk adverse in
exercising his or her discretion because in all but one case since 2002,
the referred cases have been cases with compelling new evidence that
resulted in either courts entering acquittals or prosecutors staying or
withdrawing charges.
V. CAUSES OF AND REMEDIES FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
The best information about the causes of wrongful convictions in
Canada, as well as the most frequent source for proposals about how to
prevent wrongful convictions, come from the seven public inquiries that
have examined particularly notorious wrongful convictions. As will be
seen, these inquiries have, at various times, examined the role of all
major criminal justice actors in wrongful convictions. They have also
made many recommendations about how to decrease the risk of
wrongful convictions. Provincial governments, responsible for the
administration of criminal justice, have appointed all the inquiries.
Many of the inquiries’ unimplemented recommendations have been
made to the federal government. It should be recalled that the federal
government in Canada has exclusive jurisdiction over the rules of
criminal procedure and criminal evidence.
A. The Police: The Problem of Tunnel Vision
The police play a critical role in almost all wrongful convictions. In
the Marshall case discussed above, the police virtually framed Marshall,
using oppressive tactics against young and unstable witnesses until they
were prepared to perjure themselves and falsely testify that they saw
Marshall stab Seale. The local police also persisted in their belief that
Marshall had to be guilty, even after a companion of the real killer came
forth shortly after Marshall’s 1971 conviction and told them that
Marshall was innocent.
Many commissions of inquiry that have examined wrongful
convictions have found that the police were subject to “tunnel vision” in
which they prematurely settled on a person as a suspect, did not
adequately explore other hypotheses, and interpreted ambiguous, and
even contradictory evidence, as consistent with the accused’s guilt. The
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inquiry that examined Guy Paul Morin’s wrongful conviction found that
the investigators settled on him as the prime suspect in part because they
considered him “odd.” The Commission of Inquiry recommended that
police be trained about the dangers of tunnel vision, which it defined as
“the single minded and overly narrow focus on an investigation or
prosecutorial theory so as to unreasonably colour the evaluation of
information received and one’s conduct in response to the
information.”147
In the Thomas Sophonow case, the accused was reluctant to disclose
his alibi to the police for fear that they would investigate it in a manner
so as to discredit it. The police eventually investigated the alibi in an
unsatisfactory manner. The police provided positive feedback to
eyewitnesses who identified the suspect, they told the suspect
information that would only be known to the killer, and they attempted
to bolster their case by using evidence from unreliable jailhouse
informers. The same police force, however, eventually undertook the reinvestigation that, a decade later, cleared Sophonow of the murder. The
inquiry recommended that a double blind procedure be used for
eyewitness identifications, that jailhouse informers not be used, that
exhibits and notebooks be retained for disclosure to the accused, that
interviews involving alibi witnesses be videotaped, and that the police
receive annual lectures or courses on the dangers of tunnel vision.148
A Newfoundland inquiry found that the police had engaged in tunnel
vision in two cases where there were subsequent DNA exonerations. In
one case, the police quickly decided that the accused was responsible for
his mother’s death, questioned witnesses in a manner suggestive of his
guilt, and exaggerated the importance of evidence consistent with guilt
and minimized the importance of evidence inconsistent with guilt. The
commission also found that noble cause corruption – the sense that
noble ends can justify any means – heightened the distorting effects of
tunnel vision. It recommended recording interviews in major cases,
using independent operators for polygraphs, and having independent
prosecutors carefully review the case developed by the police. The
commission also recommended that courts be more prepared to direct a
verdict of acquittal in weak cases that were prosecuted.149
Not all inquiries that have examined wrongful convictions have found
that the police engaged in tunnel vision. The inquiry into Milgaard’s
case found that “tunnel vision, negligence and misconduct have been
alleged but not shown,”150 even though it also found that a polygraph
147.
148.
149.
150.

MORIN INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 1134.
SOPHONOW INQUIRY, supra note 6.
LAMER INQUIRY, supra note 6.
MILGAARD INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 304.
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operator pressured young people to support Milgaard’s guilt. The
inquiry found no tunnel vision, even though the police did not focus on
the real perpetrator who had committed similar crimes in the same area
where Milgaard was wrongly alleged to have murdered a young woman.
This inquiry’s approach underlines the danger of seeing tunnel vision as
a form of misconduct rather than a systemic problem, especially in cases
where the police are investigating a high profile crime.
Although Canadian inquiries have frequently identified tunnel vision,
they have yet to develop effective remedies to counteract this complex
process within policing organizations. The inquiries have recommended
that superiors regularly review police investigations and that police
officers receive better training, but they have not developed
organizational solutions that would counter common presumptions of
guilt in policing.151 The inquiries have also not recommended
institutional reforms, such as those relating to building quality control
units or contrarian devils advocates within police forces.152
The inquiries have tended to stress remedies that are external to police
forces as a means to counteract police tunnel vision. These remedies
include full disclosure to the accused of all relevant information the
police hold, review of cases by independent prosecutors, decreased use
of jailhouse informers to shore up weak cases, and increased judicial use
of the directed verdict of an acquittal. A report on behalf of all
prosecutors in Canada has stressed that prosecutors can counteract
police tunnel vision by exercising independent, quasi-judicial discretion
in deciding whether to proceed with the case. The report also suggested
that, where feasible, prosecutors separate from those that advised the
police during the investigation should review charges. Second opinions,
case review, and contrarian thinking should be encouraged within the
prosecutor’s office.153 These prosecutorial checks are especially
important because tunnel vision may be difficult to detect at the trial
stage. There are restrictions on calling evidence at trial that indicates a
third party may have been responsible for a crime.154 In addition, an
accused who alleges tunnel vision at trial opens the door for the state to
respond with prejudicial hearsay evidence to support the police’s
151. Dianne Martin, The Police Role in Wrongful Convictions: An International Comparative
Study, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 77 (Westervelt & Humphrey eds.
2005).
152. John Epp, Penetrating Investigative Practice Post Morin, 31 U.B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997);
Bruce MacFarlane, Convicting the Innocent: A Triple Failure of the Justice System, 31 MAN. L.J. 403
(2006).
153. FTP HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS COMM. WORKING GROUP, CAN. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT
ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 35-41(2004). See also FTP HEADS OF
PROSECUTIONS COMM., THE PATH TO JUSTICE 54 (2011).
154. Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5.
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investigation.155
B. The Police: Identification Procedures
As in the United States, flawed identifications are a leading cause of
wrongful convictions in Canada. The Sophonow Commission focused
on the frailties of eyewitness identification and recommended the use of
a double blind identification system, and the sequential and recorded
presentation of at least ten photos in photo line-ups. Although some
police forces follow these recommendations as best practices, there are
no legislated identification procedures in Canada. Without legislative
guidance, many of the police oriented reforms to prevent wrongful
conviction depend on individual police forces voluntarily implementing
reforms. Exclusive federal jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure
may have inhibited legislative experimentation of the type available in
Australia or the United States where the states can enact their own
criminal law reforms sometimes in response to local wrongful
convictions.
The Supreme Court of Canada held in 2007 that police forces can be
sued for negligent forms of investigation. Nevertheless, the Court held
that the police were not negligent in a case where an Aboriginal man,
Jason Hill, was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned for twenty months
for a robbery he did not commit. Mr. Hill was identified in a twelve
person photo line-up that included him and eleven Caucasian foils and
was conducted after Mr. Hill’s photo had been released to the media.
The identification procedure was also not conducted in a double blind
manner and was conducted on two witnesses at the same time. Although
the police did not engage in good practices as measured by today’s
standards, the Court concluded that there was no negligence because the
flawed photo line-up did not breach standards that applied in 1995 when
the false identification was obtained.156 The Court also found no
negligence, even though the police did not attempt to halt the
prosecution when similar robberies continued after Hill’s arrest.157 Even
if there is more success in subsequent cases, civil litigation is an
indirect, diffuse, and uncertain means of ensuring that the police use
proper identification procedures compared to legislated standards.

155. Van, 2005 SCC 5.
156. Hamilton Wentworth Police, 2007 SCC 41, ¶ 78.
157. The Court concluded, “This was not a case of tunnel-vision or blinding oneself to the facts,”
in part because in 1995 “awareness of the danger of wrongful convictions was less acute than it is today.
There was credible evidence supporting the charge.” Id. at ¶ 88.
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C. The Police: Interrogation Procedures
The Supreme Court has recognized that false confessions are a cause
of wrongful convictions. The Court stressed that one of the purposes of
the traditional common law rule that requires the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that confessions obtained by persons in
authority are voluntary is to protect against the danger of false
confessions.158 At the same time, however, the Court refused to exclude
confessions taken after a prolonged interrogation that caused the
accused much emotional distress, in part because of his fear that the
police would interrogate his fiancé.159 The Court made the questionable
assumption that “false confessions are rarely the product of proper
police techniques.”160 It also ruled that while recording of confessions
was advisable, a failure to record an interrogation did not render a
confession inadmissible.161 Serious concerns have been raised that the
test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is not sensitive
enough to characteristics of the accused, such as mental disabilities or
instabilities and drug withdrawal, which could help produce false
confessions.162
The Supreme Court has held that confessions are still admissible even
if the accused has asserted his preference to remain silent163 and made
numerous requests to see his lawyer, so long as the suspect has been
afforded a reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer. The Court also
held that there is no constitutional requirement that a defence lawyer be
present during an interrogation.164 These cases suggest that courts are
often reluctant to exclude confessions perhaps because of fears of
preventing the police from obtaining legitimate confessions and perhaps
because of the severity of exclusion as a remedy. In addition, the courts
are even more reluctant to exclude confessions that may be false
because of personal characteristics, such as a mental disability. The
leading case suggests that statements from the accused are admissible as
long as they have a basic operating mind.165 The courts have admitted
confessions from people with significant mental disabilities because
they have concluded that the police have acted properly in the

158. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38.
159. Id. at ¶ 104.
160. Id. at ¶ 45.
161. Id. at ¶ 46.
162. Christopher Sherrin, False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law, 30 QUEENS L.J.
601 (2005).
163. Singh, 2007 SCC 48.
164. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35.
165. R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914 (Can.).
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interrogation process.166
The Canadian courts have attempted to encourage the police to
videotape interrogations, but they have stopped short of requiring such
recording as a pre-requisite to admission.167 This presents a danger that a
false confession may ring true because it includes “hold back”
information only known to the real perpetrator and the police.
Parliament has not legislated any recording requirements, or indeed any
other procedures, for interviewing adults.168 As with identification
procedures, this means that only the courts enforce the rules designed to
prevent false confessions. As suggested above, courts are reluctant to
exclude confessions even if they are obtained after intense interrogations
or from those with significant mental disabilities or mental health issues.
Even the limited protections against false confessions, the
voluntariness rule and the right to counsel offer are not available when
suspects do not know that they are speaking to police officers. Police
forces in Canada have frequently engaged in expensive, prolonged, and
sophisticated “Mr. Big” operations, where they pose as criminals and
hold out a lucrative life style to a suspect if they admit to committing a
crime as a prerequisite to joining the fake criminal organization. The
intensity of some of the operations can be seen as a form of tunnel
vision in cases where the police are convinced of the suspect’s guilt, but
do not have enough independent evidence to convict. There is also a
danger that the suspect may be given hold back information known only
to the perpetrator during these operations, which are not always
recorded or are recorded selectively. The Supreme Court has held that
the confessions rule does not apply to these operations.169 Other courts
have refused to admit expert evidence about the dangers and
mechanisms of false confessions in Mr. Big cases.170 One recent case,
however, has excluded confessions obtained through an intensive “Mr.
Big” operation, in large part because of the risk of a wrongful conviction
based on unreliable evidence.171
A Mr. Big operation has been associated with at least one wrongful

166. Kent Roach & Andrea Bailey, The Relevance of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder in
Canadian Criminal Law From Investigation to Sentencing, 42 U.B.C.L. REV. 1, 12-28, (2009)
(outlining cases where judges have accepted statements that may have been influenced by brain injuries
caused by fetal alcohol spectrum disorder).
167. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38.
168. The Youth Criminal Justice Act ss.25-26, 146 does provide some additional safeguards
relating to the right to counsel and the right of a parent to be present, but does not require the recording
of interrogations of young persons.
169. R. v. Hodgson, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449 (Can.); Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5 (Can.).
170. R. v. Osmar, 2007 ONCA 50 (Can.); R. v. Bonisteel, (2008) BCCA 344 (Can.); R. v.
Jeanvenne, 2011 ONSC 7244.
171. R. v. Hart, 2012 NLCA 61, ¶¶ 168, 213, 260 (CanLII), available at http://canlii.ca/t/fsr1k.
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conviction. Kyle Unger was convicted of a brutal murder on the basis of
hair comparison evidence, testimony from a jailhouse informer, and
confessions he made during a Mr. Big operation. His conviction was
affirmed in 1993, with the Manitoba Court of Appeal refusing to
exclude the confession obtained from the Mr. Big operation.172 In 2005,
Unger was granted bail pending his successful application to the
Minister of Justice to re-open his conviction. The judge who granted bail
noted that the hair comparison was disproved by DNA. The judge also
expressed concerns about the reliability of the confessions obtained in
the Mr. Big Operation. The judge observed that Unger, who was
unemployed, in part because he was suspected of the killing, confessed
to the killing only after “being wined, dined, and shown large sums of
money.”173 The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered a new trial, at
which Unger was acquitted, but the government has refused to provide
compensation because of his confessions made during the Mr. Big
operation, even though the details of those confessions have been
proven to be false. Mr. Unger is now suing police and prosecutors
involved in his wrongful conviction.174
D. Prosecutorial Conduct: The Independent and Quasi-Judicial
Role of Prosecutors
Prosecutors in Canada are all appointed officials who do not stand for
election. They are supposed to be interested in seeing that justice is
done. In other words, they should not be simple adversaries concerned
with obtaining a conviction.175 Both the Marshall and the Lamer
Commissions of Inquiry called for the creation of independent Director
of Public Prosecutions systems as a means to re-enforce the
independence of prosecutors. Such systems now exist in both provinces,
as well as in other provinces and at the federal level. Any
communication from the Attorney General, who is an elected politician
who sits in Cabinet, to the Director of Public Prosecutions would have
to be published and disclosed. The Director of Public Prosecutions holds
office in good behaviour for a guaranteed term. The Lamer Commission
stressed that independent prosecutors should serve as a check on police
investigations and tunnel vision that could result in wrongful

172. R. v. Unger, 1993 CanLII 4409 (MB CA), available at http://canlii.ca/t/1pfk2.
173. R. v. Unger, 2005 MBQB 238, ¶¶ 17–19.
174. Unger Won’t Get Compensation: Minister, CBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2009),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2009/10/23/mb-compensation-unger-chomiak-manitoba.html;
Kyle Unger files 14.5 million wrongful conviction suit, CBC News (Sept, 21, 2011), available at
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2011/09/21/kyle-unger-wrongful-conviction-lawsuit.html.
175. R. v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R. 16 (Can.).
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convictions.
Canada’s reliance on appointed prosecutors who have autonomy from
political interference allows prosecutors, in some cases, to agree to
procedures designed to correct wrongful convictions. For example, the
prosecutor in the 1983 Marshall appeal persisted in making a joint
submission that Marshall’s 1971 murder conviction should be quashed,
despite receiving some resistance from higher officials. In many of the
cases stemming from the flawed forensic pathology of Dr. Smith, the
prosecutor has agreed to appeals out of time, the admission of fresh
evidence, and the quashing of convictions. There are a number of nonDNA cases where Canadian prosecutors have agreed not only to the
quashing of a wrongful conviction, but the entry of an acquittal.176
The quasi-judicial role of the prosecutor as a Minister of Justice
manifests itself not only in the treatment of individual cases but in
systemic matters. In some provinces, prosecutors have agreed to conduct
proactive audits of cases involving suspect forms of evidence or the
involvement of criminal justice actors that have played a role in
wrongful convictions. Such audits are a promising alternative to reliance
on the adversarial system as a means to discover wrongful convictions.
Prosecutors in Canada have also taken some proactive responsibility on
policy matters relating to wrongful convictions. A national task force of
prosecutorial officials issued a lengthy report in 2004 based in large part
on the findings of Canada’s inquiries into wrongful convictions. This
report was also supported by scholarship by Bruce MacFarlane, Q.C.,
who was the most senior civil servant in Manitoba responsible for
justice.177 The same national task force of senior prosecutors issued a
revised version of the report in 2011.178 Canadian prosecutors deserve
praise both for recognizing wrongful convictions in many individual
cases and for taking a policy interest in the prevention of wrongful
convictions.
176. R. v. Henry, 2010 BCCA 462 (Can.); R. v. Webber 2010 ONCA 4 (Can.).
177. MacFarlane’s work was subsequently published. Bruce MacFarlane, Convicting the
Innocent: A Triple Failure of Criminal Justice, 31 Man.L.J.403 (2006).
178. FTP HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS COMM. WORKING GROUP, CAN., DEPT OF JUSTICE, REPORT
ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 35-41 (2004), available at http://www.justice.
gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/pmj-pej/pmj-pej.pdf; FPT HEADS OF PROSECUTION, THE PATH TO JUSTICE:
PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (2011), available at http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/ptjspj/ptj-spj-eng.pdf. But see Christopher Sherrin, Comment in the Report on the Prevention of
Miscarriages of Justice, 52 CRIM. L.Q, 140 (2007) for some criticism of the prosecutors report. In their
latest report, the prosecutors consider prior criticisms of their earlier report but still disapprove of expert
evidence on the frailties of eyewitness identification while conceding that such expert knowledge can be
used in the training of police and prosecutors. They also continue to recommend that only interrogations
in cases of considerable violence be recorded. THE PATH TO JUSTICE 76, 94 (2011). To its credit, the
new report does discuss the problem of the innocent pleading guilty and states that “the Subcommittee
wishes to reiterate that all participants in the criminal justice system must be vigilant to guard against
creating an environment in which innocent people are induced to plead guilty.” Id. at 207.
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E. Prosecutorial Conduct: Disclosure
An important factor in many wrongful convictions has been the
failure of prosecutors to disclose all relevant material in their
possession. As discussed earlier, the Marshall Commission of Inquiry
found that a failure of the Crown to disclose inconsistent statements
made by lying witnesses was an important factor in Marshall’s wrongful
conviction. In addition, a companion of the real killer told the police that
Marshall was not the killer shortly after Marshall’s conviction—but this
critical information was not disclosed by either the police or the
prosecutor to Marshall or his lawyer. In response to these findings, the
Commission of Inquiry recommended that Parliament amend the
Criminal Code to place a continuing statutory disclosure duty on the
prosecution. As is, unfortunately, often the case, legislative reform to
minimize the risk of wrongful convictions was not a priority and
Parliament has yet to enact a statutory code of disclosure. Indeed,
Parliament’s actions in this area have only sought to place limits on the
disclosure of therapeutic records of complainants in sexual assault
cases.179
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the landmark case of
R. v. Stinchcombe.180 Justice Sopinka, for a unanimous Court, stated:
The right to make full answer and defence is one of the pillars of criminal
justice on which we heavily depend to ensure that the innocent are not
convicted. Recent events have demonstrated that the erosion of this right
due to non-disclosure was an important factor in the conviction and
incarceration of an innocent person. In the Royal Commission on the
Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Vol. 1: Findings and
Recommendations (1989) (the “Marshall Commission Report”), the
Commissioners found that prior inconsistent statements were not
disclosed to the defence. This was an important contributing factor in the
miscarriage of justice which occurred and led the Commission to state
that “anything less than complete disclosure by the Crown falls short of
decency and fair play” (Vol. 1 at p. 238).181

The Court based the broad disclosure obligation placed on the
prosecutor (frequently called the Crown in Canada) on the idea that the
prosecutor was not a pure adversary and was interested in ensuring
justice rather than winning. The new constitutional rule of disclosure
was broader than the statutory rule the Marshall commission proposed
because the new rule applied to all relevant information regardless of
whether it was classified as exculpatory or inculpatory and regardless of
179. This legislation was upheld under the Charter in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (Can.).
180. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
181. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss4/19

46

Roach: Wrongful Convictions in Canada

2012]

WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CANADA

1511

whether it related to a person that the prosecutor proposed to call as a
witness. The only exceptions the Court recognized were for evidentiary
privileges, such as the informer privilege and the timing of the
disclosure. Finally, the Court made clear that the duty of disclosure was
a continuing one.
Subsequent decisions have continued to define disclosure rights
broadly to include relevant material that might open up lines of inquiry
for the accused.182 The obligation to disclose relevant information also
entails a duty to preserve such information.183 In 2003, the Supreme
Court observed that the idea that disclosure was simply “an act of
goodwill” and not a right, “played a significant part in catastrophic
judicial errors” that resulted in wrongful convictions.184 A 2009 decision
has affirmed that the police have a duty under Stinchcombe to disclose
relevant material to the Crown prosecutor and that, in some cases, the
duty may extend to disciplinary records of a police officer.185 In that
case, the Court also indicated while the accused must request disclosure,
the Crown must disclose not only the evidence it will introduce but “any
information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it
may assist the accused in the exercise of the right to make full answer
and defence” so long as it is “not clearly irrelevant, privileged or its
disclosure is otherwise governed by law.” The Crown’s duty may
require it to obtain relevant information from other state agencies.
Finally, “the Crown’s obligation survives the trial and, in the appellate
context, the scope of relevant information therefore includes any
information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it
may assist the appellant in prosecuting an appeal.”186 The experience of
wrongful convictions and a desire to prevent them has decisively shaped
the Supreme Court’s approach to constitutional disclosure obligations.
F. Jailhouse Informers
Jailhouse informers with incentives to lie have played a role in a
number of wrongful convictions. The Morin Inquiry found that two
jailhouse informers used to bolster the murder prosecution against
Morin were utterly unreliable. It stopped short of recommending a
complete ban on the use of jailhouse informer. Instead, the Inquiry
recommended that a committee of senior prosecutors approve any use of
jailhouse informers, a reform that was subsequently introduced in
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

R. v. Dixon, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244 (Can.); R. v. Tallifer, 2003 SCC 70 (Can.).
R. v. La, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 680 (Can.).
Tallifer, 2003 SCC 70, ¶ 1.
R. v. McNeil, [2009] S.C.R. 66 (Can.).
Id. at ¶ 17–18.
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Ontario and some other provinces. The Sophonow Inquiry took a bolder
approach and recommended a general rule that jailhouse informers not
be allowed to testify, a recommendation the Lamer Inquiry also
approved.187 The Supreme Court has, however, not followed this
recommendation and has allowed jailhouse informers to testify without
even a mandatory rule that warnings about their unreliability be given.188
In a subsequent case, however, the Court allowed new evidence that was
inconsistent with a jailhouse informer’s testimony to be introduced
under its fairly liberal approach to the admission of new evidence.189 As
in the false confession and identification contexts, the Supreme Court
has been reluctant to exclude evidence, even though evidence from
jailhouse informers has, in the past, contributed to wrongful convictions.
G. Defence Lawyers and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ineffective assistance of counsel can also play a role in wrongful
convictions. The Marshall Commission criticized Marshall’s lawyers for
not requesting disclosure or conducting their own investigations. The
Goudge Inquiry into forensic pediatric pathology stressed the need for
lawyers to be adequately trained and funded to deal with complex issues
of forensic pediatric pathology. Guilty pleas were entered in many of the
cases involving Dr. Smith, the defence in those cases may not have been
prepared to rebut the flawed forensic pathology evidence offered by the
state, even though the accused maintained their innocence.190 These
cases, and other cases involving wrongful convictions arising out of
guilty pleas,191 raise issues of whether it is competent and ethical for a
defence lawyer to enter a guilty plea on behalf of a client who maintains
his or her innocence, so as to receive a lighter sentence than will be
imposed should the client be convicted after the completion of a trial.

187. SOPHONOW INQUIRY, supra note 6; LAMER INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 22.
188. Brooks, 2000 SCC 11. The Court did, however, provide subsequent guidance about the
ability of trial judges to give warnings about why some forms of testimony should receive special
scrutiny and why it may be dangerous to convict on the basis of such unconfirmed testimony. R. v.
Khela, 2009 SCC 4, ¶ 37.
189. Hurley, 2010 SCC 18.
190. For an example of an early case where Dr Smith testified but the accused was acquitted after
a middle class family mortgaged its home and put on a defence containing multiple experts from around
the world, see R. v. M(S.), 1991 O.J. 1383 (Can.) (discussed in the GOUDGE REPORT, supra note 6, at
12).
191. Hanemaayer, 2008 ONCA 580. Note that there is increasing recognition in the United States
of wrongful convictions arising from guilty pleas. See SAMUEL GROSS AND MICHAEL SHAFFER,
EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989-2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS 8 (2012) available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf (8% of 873 recorded exonerations between 1989 and 2012
involving guilty pleas).
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They also raise questions about the dangers of leaving the acceptance of
guilty pleas to the discretion of trial judges. There are no special rules in
Canada to limit the ability of trial judges to accept guilty pleas from
those who maintain innocence or to require the judge to conduct a more
searching examination of the factual basis of the guilty plea.192
Ineffective assistance of counsel combined with judicial passivity in
accepting guilty pleas dramatically increases the risk of wrongful
convictions.193
In R. v. G.D.B.,194 the Supreme Court recognized that the right to
effective assistance of counsel was a principle of fundamental justice
protected under s.7 of the Charter. The Court held that this right would
only be violated if counsel’s conduct was unreasonable and incompetent
and if the conduct resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Court
followed the oft-criticized United States Supreme Court decision of
Strickland v. Washington.195 Following that decision, there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct is reasonable. Moreover, the court
will not even determine the reasonableness of defence counsel’s conduct
unless the accused can demonstrate that the alleged incompetence
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Court added, “miscarriages of
justice may take many forms in this context. In some instances,
counsel’s performance may have resulted in procedural unfairness. In
others, the reliability of the trial’s result may have been
compromised.”196 In the result, the Court found that counsel had made a
tactical decision not to use a tape where the complainant stated the
accused had not sexually abused her. The Court held that the defence
counsel’s failure to use the tape did not affect the reliability of the
conviction. Canadian accused have not enjoyed much success in
subsequent claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.197
H. Forensic and Other Expert Evidence
A number of wrongful convictions in Canada have been caused by

192. The leading Supreme Court precedent, rendered long before the recognition of wrongful
convictions, maintains that trial judges have discretion whether to accept guilty pleas over a strong
dissent by Laskin J. that trial judges should determine the factual basis and voluntariness of the guilty
plea. Adgey v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 426 (Can.).
193. For a very disturbing example where the Supreme Court accepted a guilty plea to non-capital
murder in a case where the defence lawyers at trial maintained that he did not understand the mind of
the Aboriginal accused, see Brosseau v. The Queen, [1969] S.C.R. 181 (Can.).
194. 2000 SCC 22.
195. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
196. R. v. G.D.B. 2000 SCC 22, ¶ 28.
197. Dale E. Ives, The ‘Canadian’ Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 42 BRANDEIS
L.J. 239 (2003).
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faulty forensic evidence.198 There are two main ways to respond to such
dangers. One is by reforming the production of the state’s forensic
evidence. The other is for the courts to take steps to ensure that the
forensic evidence used in the trial is reliable.199
The Commission of Inquiry into Proceedings against Guy Paul Morin
in its 1998 report found that Ontario’s Centre for Forensic Science had
made numerous mistakes in the production of hair and fibre evidence
that purported to link Morin to a murder before his DNA exoneration.
Before the inquiry, Crown prosecutors had assumed that the Centre was
infallible. The Commission, however, found problems in contamination
of evidence and the misuse of published research.200 The Centre for
Forensic Science, which is the central crime laboratory in the province
of Ontario, undertook many reforms in response to the findings and
recommendations of the Morin inquiry.201 A decade later, a similar
inquiry was held in the neighbouring province of Manitoba when hair
comparison evidence was again refuted by DNA testing. The Manitoba
Inquiry heard that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police labs had stopped
conducting hair comparison evidence in light of more advanced DNA
testing, but stopped short of recommending that such hair comparison
evidence be inadmissible. It also did not recommend that the crime
laboratories be separated from the police. Finally, it suggested that it did
not have jurisdiction to order a national audit of cases that relied on hair
comparison evidence, even though the province of Manitoba had
conducted such an inquiry.202
Many of the same themes found in the Morin inquiry, which focused
on hair and fibre comparison evidence, re-emerged a decade later when
the Ontario Commission of Inquiry into Forensic Pediatric Pathology
(the Goudge Inquiry) recommended similar reforms to the practice of
forensic pathology. The Goudge Inquiry found problems in the lack of
forensic training of pathologists, including Dr. Smith, and a lack of
supervision of his work and testimony. Medical doctors who were
supposed to supervise Dr. Smith did not have the adequate training in

198. See generally BIBI SANGHA, ET AL. FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE 241–322 (2010).
199. For an evaluation of the balance between these two mechanisms, see Gary Edmond & Kent
Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic and Medical Evidence, 61 U.
TORONTO L.J. 343 (2011).
200. MORIN INQUIRY, supra note 6 , at117-118.
201. Jeffrey Manishen, Wrongful Convictions, Lessons Learned: The Canadian Experience, 13 J.
CLINICAL FORENSIC MEDICINE 296 (2006) (the reforms included post-conviction DNA testing of hair
“matches,” recording of preliminary reports, increased training, new protocols for reports and
complaints, documentation of contamination, monitoring of courtroom testimony and the creation of an
advisory board and a quality assurance unit).
202. DRISKELL INQUIRY, supra note 6 , at 174-185.
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forensic pathology to do so. The Goudge Inquiry stopped short of
recommending that Ontario move from a coroner’s system to one where
forensic pathologists were fully responsible for death investigations.
Subsequent to that inquiry, the chief forensic pathologist was given
increased funds and powers to supervise the conduct of forensic
autopsies and reports. These reforms included the creation of an
oversight counsel and the maintenance of a registry of qualified forensic
pathologists.203 The follow up to this Commission demonstrates that
forensic pathology can be reformed within a coroner’s system. At the
same time, it is unfortunate that those who allowed Dr. Smith to provide
unreliable expert evidence ignored many of the earlier recommendations
of the Morin Inquiry with respect to report writing, quality assurance,
and the monitoring of court-room testimony. The fragmented nature of
the forensic sciences presents a danger that they will only be
incrementally reformed on a discipline-by-discipline, jurisdiction-byjurisdiction basis in response to notorious wrongful convictions.204
Both the Morin and Goudge Inquiries recommended that trial judges
should be more vigilant in excluding expert evidence that does not
satisfy threshold reliability standards, regardless of whether the science
could be characterized as novel or not. The Goudge Inquiry also
emphasized that experts should not be allowed to testify outside of their
area of recognized expertise.205 It stopped short, however, of
recommending that the state’s expert evidence should, consistent with
criminal justice values, be held to a higher standard of demonstrable
reliability.206 Canadian courts apply tests for expert evidence that are
influenced by Daubert.207 They have moved away from admissibility
tests that focused on general acceptance and whether experts have
special knowledge through education or experience, to tests that require
203. Act to amend the Coroner’s Act S.O. 2009 c.15.
204. Kent Roach, Forensic Science and Miscarriages of Justice: Some Lessons from Comparative
Experience, 50 JURIMETRICS 67 (2009).
205. For a troubling case involving the multidisciplinary child abuse and neglect team that Dr.
Charles Smith worked with and in which the Supreme Court deferred to a trial judge’s decision to allow
a burn expert to testify about child abuse and a child abuse expert to testify about burns see R. v.
Marquard, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223. For critical discussion see GOUDGE INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 473–74.
206. As proposed in Gary Edmond, Pathological Science? Demonstrable Reliability and Expert
Forensic Pathology Evidence, in PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (Roach
ed., 2008); see also Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the
State’s Forensic and Medical Evidence, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 343 (2011). This proposal has drawn
criticism on the basis that it would be unfair to impose a higher burden on the prosecutor and that the
reasonable doubt standard for conviction adequately controls for the reliability of forensic evidence. See
Kenneth Chasse, Junk Science by Way of a Higher Burden of Proof, 16 CAN. CRIM. L.Rev. 323; Nayha
Acharya, Law’s Treatment of Science: From Idealization to Understanding, 36 Dal. L.J. 57 (2013). For
our replies see Gary Edmond and Kent Roach, Comment, 16 CAN. CRIM. L.Rev. 357 (2012); Gary
Edmond and Kent Roach, Trial by Theory, 36 Dal. L.J. 57 (2013).
207. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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that the expert opinion evidence be necessary in assisting the trier of fact
and that it be subject to peer review and testing.208 The Supreme Court
has stressed that science that might be accepted in a clinical setting to
treat a patient, may have too high an error rate to justify its use as
forensic evidence in criminal proceedings.209 There is a new emphasis in
Canada on ‘evidence’ as opposed to ‘experience’ based expert scientific
opinion. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in the 2007 Stephen Truscott
appeal, for example, disregarded two opinions offered by a forensic
pathologist and an entomology expert about the time of death because
they were only based on the admittedly considerable experience of the
Crown’s experts and did not engage with the scientific literature.210
In 2007, the Supreme Court in a 4–3 decision in R. v. Trochym,
excluded post-hypnosis testimony of a witness who purported to provide
eyewitness identification.211 The majority stressed the importance of
determining the threshold reliability of the evidence and started its
judgment by noting that recent wrongful convictions had confirmed “the
need to carefully scrutinize evidence presented against an accused for
reliability and prejudicial effect, and to ensure the basic fairness of the
criminal process.”212 In deciding that post-hypnosis testimony should be
excluded, the Court was not deterred by the fact that it had been
accepted in previous cases and might not be characterized as novel
science, noting that “the admissibility of scientific evidence is not frozen
in time.”213 The court stressed that what was ‘most troubling’ about
post-hypnosis evidence was:
[T]he potential rate of error in the additional information obtained
through hypnosis when it is used for forensic purposes. At the present
time, there is no way of knowing whether such information will be
accurate or inaccurate. Such uncertainty is unacceptable in a court of
law.214

The majority of the Supreme Court in Trochym demonstrated an
appropriate concern about the risk of wrongful convictions and the risk
of relying on evidence of unknown reliability. This decision could
potentially lead to the exclusion or qualification of expert evidence
provided by experience based forensic sciences, especially those based
on comparisons and pattern recognition. The Goudge Inquiry
208. R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 at 19; R. v. L.-J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600 (excluding various
forms of novel science offered by the accused).
209. R. v. L.-J. [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600.
210. Re Truscott, 2007 ONCA at 165–69, 313–14.
211. [2007] 1 S.C.R. 239.
212. Id. at 1.
213. Id. at 31.
214. Id. at 55.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss4/19

52

Roach: Wrongful Convictions in Canada

2012]

WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CANADA

1517

recommended that trial judges should, following Trochym, determine
the threshold reliability of expert forensic evidence and that legal aid
funding and training of defence counsel and judges be increased to
achieve this objective.215
In a more recent case, the Ontario Court of Appeal has affirmed that
trial judges have discretion to exclude expert evidence that otherwise
satisfies the criteria for admissibility because of concerns about its
threshold reliability and possible prejudicial effect. Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred by excluding
evidence the prosecution offered from a sociologist about the meaning
of a tear drop tattoo on an accused charged with a gang-related murder.
The Court of Appeal stressed that the trial judge’s concerns about the
unknown error rate and lack of a random sample for the sociologist’s
research was inappropriate given the nature of sociology. At the same
time, the Court of Appeal regulated the content of the expert evidence
by prohibiting the expert from testifying that the tattoo meant the
accused killed someone. The accused was, however, subsequently
convicted of first degree murder after the sociologist testified that the
tattoo meant either that he had either killed someone or someone close
to the accused had died when they had not.216 A critical question is
whether similar concerns about the impossibility of determining precise
error rates will allow forensic sciences to continue to be used in the
absence of basic research on the validity of the experience based
opinions drawn by fingerprint and handwriting analysts. If this occurs,
judicial admissibility decisions will not provide a strong incentive to
reform the forensic sciences. Much will depend on the steps that various
provinces and laboratories take to ensure the reliability and quality of
forensic evidence the prosecution offers.
I. Judges and Juries
Judges are appointed and not elected in Canada. As in the Marshall
case, the decisions of trial judges to admit or exclude evidence can play
an important role in wrongful convictions. The Supreme Court has
215. GOUDGE INQUIRY, supra note 6, chs. 17-18.
216. R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624; see Man convicted 4 years after acquittal, TORONTO STAR,
Mar. 29, 2011. For criticisms of the Court of Appeal’s approach in Abbey and arguments that the expert
evidence did not satisfy the necessity standard for admissibility see Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A
Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic and Medical Evidence, 61 U.
TORONTO L.J. 343, 392-396. For findings that cases such as Abbey are not unusual and that courts in
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all been reluctant to exclude expert
evidence because of reliability concerns see Gary Edmond, et al., Admissibility compared: The reception
of incriminating expert opinion (i.e., forensic science) evidence in four adversarial jurisdictions, U
Denv. Crim. L. Rev (forthcoming).
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deferred to the discretion of trial judges to admit expert evidence, even
when experts may have strayed from their area of expertise.217 More
recently, it has indicated that trial judges should be more active in
determining the threshold reliability of evidence, including expert
evidence.218 Trial judges should help ensure that qualified experts are
not allowed to give evidence outside of the realm of expertise.
Restrictions on the admissibility of expert evidence can, however, work
to the disadvantage of the accused who may be wrongfully convicted.
Canadian courts remain reluctant to allow the accused to call expert
evidence on the frailties of eyewitness identification219 or false
confessions.220 One of the reasons why Tammy Marquardt faced the
possibility of a new trial was that the Court of Appeal discounted
testimony by neurologists that her son may have died from an epileptic
seizure because of the limits of their expertise.221
Trial judges have much discretion in deciding whether to accept a
guilty plea. In light of recent wrongful convictions that have been
revealed after guilty pleas, trial judges should be more active in
determining whether there is a factual basis for a guilty plea. The
National Judicial Institute of Canada provides an intense three day
training session for trial judges on the causes and dangers of wrongful
convictions. Judges have also made creative decisions in allowing
possible victims of wrongful convictions to be released on bail pending
the Minister of Justice’s decision to re-open their case after appeals have
been exhausted.222
Public inquiries have been reluctant to criticize juries for the role they
have played in wrongful convictions. Although juries are used
infrequently in Canadian criminal cases, they are mandatory in murder
cases, unless the accused and the prosecutor both agree to a bench trial.
The jury that convicted Donald Marshall Jr. was all white and was not
screened for possible bias against Marshall because he was Aboriginal.
Moreover, one of the jurors subsequently explained the guilty verdict on
the basis of racist stereotypes about both Marshall and the AfricanCanadian victim. Canadian courts now allow potential jurors to be

217. R. v. Marquard, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223 (allowing child abuse experts to testify about burns and
burn experts to testify about child abuse). The Goudge Commission noted some of the dangers of this
approach and that the Court now takes a more rigorous approach to the admissibility of expert evidence.
GOUDGE INQUIRY, supra note 6, at 473–74.
218. R. v. Trochym, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 239.
219. R. v. McIntosh, (1997) 117 C.C.C.(3d) 385 (Ont.C.A.); R. v. Woodard, 2009 MBCA 42.
220. Re Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202.
221. R. v. Marquardt, 2011 ONCA 281 at ¶ 21.
222. R. v. Phillion, [2003] O.J. No. 3422 (Ont. Sup. Ct. of Just.); R. v. Driskell, 2004 MBQB 3;
R. v. Unger, 2005 MBQB 238; Ostrowski v. The Queen et al., 2009 MBQB 327 (Can.).
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questioned about possible racist bias.223 Canadian courts, however,
carefully regulate the questions that can be put to prospective jurors.
Tammy Marquardt was not allowed to question prospective jurors about
whether they would be biased against her because she was charged (and
wrongfully convicted) of killing her young child.224 The Supreme Court
has upheld the absolute secrecy of jury deliberations even in the face of
allegations of racist statements from jury members.225 The role of juries
in wrongful convictions, especially those involving accused from
minority communities and allegations of horrific crimes, remains an
important but understudied topic. This is especially so given the
Supreme Court’s clear statements that appellate courts should defer to
convictions entered by juries, especially those based on credibility
determinations.226
The Marshall commission criticized the appeal court that heard
Marshall’s first appeal for not examining legal errors the trial judge
made that were apparent in the transcripts but that Marshall’s lawyers
did not argue on appeal. It recommended that appeal courts be more
proactive with respect to errors that might contribute to wrongful
convictions.227 This raises interesting questions about the balance
between adversarial approaches that rely on party presentation of the
issues and more judge-centred inquisitorial approaches. Appeal courts
also have the power to appoint commissioners to gather new evidence to
assist on appeals. Although such inquiries have been conducted in at
least one wrongful conviction case,228 the appointment of such
commissioners are rare. Appeal courts also have the power to appoint
publicly funded counsel to assist with appeals.
Canada has a unitary court system that in most cases only allows the
accused one appeal as of right and does not allow collateral challenge by
way of habeas corpus. The Canadian system allows much less scope for
successive challenges than the American system. This approach is,
however, mitigated by the fact that Canadian courts appear to be more
willing to entertain appeals out of time and to admit fresh evidence on
appeal than most American courts. A related factor is that unelected
Canadian prosecutors more frequently consent to measures to correct
wrongful convictions than their American counterparts.229
223. R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128.
224. R. v. Find, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863.
225. R. v. Pan, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344.
226. R. v. W.H., 2013 SCC 22.
227. MARSHALL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 87.
228. R. v. Neepose, 1992 ABCA 77.
229. Kent Roach, Less Procedure, More Justice? A Comparison of Canadian and American
Wrongful Convictions, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: CAUSES AND
REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 283-308 (C. Ronald Huff
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At the same time, the Canadian appeal system has frequently failed to
detect wrongful convictions. For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal
dismissed William Mullins-Johnson’s appeal from his wrongful
conviction for the murder and sexual assault of his four-year-old niece.
The majority of the court held that the trial judge had adequately
instructed the jury about the accused’s defence that no crime had been
committed. Borins, J.A., however, dissented on the basis that the trial
judge did not adequately instruct the jury about the weakness of the
evidence that the child victim had been sexually assaulted.230 The
Supreme Court, sitting only as five judges, dismissed Mullins-Johnson’s
subsequent appeal after an oral hearing but without bothering to provide
written reasons.231 In hindsight, the appeal process failed to prevent a
wrongful conviction that was only reversed after the Minister of Justice
ordered a new appeal on the basis of new pathology evidence that
suggested that a sexual assault did not occur and that the cause of the
victim’s death was unascertained.232
The Supreme Court of Canada has been more sympathetic to the
danger of wrongful convictions than the United States Supreme Court.
The Canadian Court’s two most important decisions with respect to
wrongful convictions was its recognition of a broad constitutional right
to disclosure in the 1991 case of R. v. Stinchcombe233 and its 2001
decision holding that the risk of wrongful convictions would now
require Canada to seek assurances that the death penalty would not be
applied before extraditing fugitives.234 Its 2007 decision excluding posthypnosis testimony because of its unknown reliability235 also has
promise in minimizing the risk of wrongful convictions from unreliable
evidence. The Court has also recognized the ability of people to bring
civil suits with respect to malicious prosecution236 and negligent police
investigation.237
The Supreme Court’s performance on other issues, especially those
relating to the admissibility of evidence that may be unreliable, has been
less robust. It has neither prohibited nor even required mandatory
warnings about testimony from jailhouse informers despite their

& Martin Killias eds., 2013).
230. R. v. Mullins-Johnson, [1996] 112 C.C.C. (3d) 117 (Ont.C.A.).
231. R. v. Mullins-Johnson, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 977.
232. R. v. Mullins-Johnson, 2007 ONCA 720.
233. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
234. United States v. Burns & Rafay, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283.
235. R. v. Trochym, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 239.
236. Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170; Proulx v. Quebec, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 9; Miazga v.
Kvello Estate, [2009] S.C.C. 51.
237. Hill v. Hamilton Wentworth, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129.
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frequent use in wrongful conviction cases.238 It has adopted a strict test
for ineffective assistance of counsel without apparent recognition that a
very similar test has been widely criticized in the United States.239 It has
allowed in-dock identifications to continue, even while conceding the
minimal probative value of such judicial “show-up” identifications.240
The Court has rejected the idea that convictions should be overturned
because the appellate court has a lurking doubt about guilt and stressed
the need to defer to convictions entered by juries;241 it has allowed
prejudicial investigative hearsay to be used to counter claims that police
investigations are tainted by tunnel vision;242 it has restricted the
admission of evidence of third parties who may be responsible for
crimes;243 it has allowed confessions to be admitted after intense
interrogations despite the dangers of false confessions;244 and it has not
prevented intense Mr. Big stings despite the risk that they may result in
false confessions.245
There is also a danger that the federal Parliament has deferred to
uneven judicial regulation of police practices such as identification and
interrogation procedures even though legislative regulation would be
more comprehensive and likely more effective in changing police and
prosecutorial conduct.246 Parliament has rejected a number of reforms
proposed by provincial inquiries to decrease the risks of wrongful
convictions. For example, it has refused to follow the recommendations
of six inquiries that the petition procedure to the federal Minister of
Justice be replaced by applications to an independent commission with
investigative powers. In recent years, Parliament has almost uniformly
pursued “tough on crime” and “victims rights” agendas and has
demonstrated little concern about wrongful convictions. Indeed, its
record is worse than that of the American Congress that has enacted
some measures to facilitate DNA evidence retention and testing.
Parliament’s record is also worse than the record of some state
legislatures that have enacted reforms in response to wrongful
convictions, including the creation of the North Carolina Innocence
Inquiry Commission to respond to claims of factual innocence and
various state laws to regulate police identification procedures.247
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

R. v. Brooks, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 237; R. v. Hurley, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 637.
R. v. G.D.B., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520.
R. v. Hibbert, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 445.
R. v. Biniaris, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381; R. v. W.H. 2013 SCC 22.
R. v. Van, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 716.
R. v. Grandinetti, [2005] 1 S.C.R.27.
R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3.
R. v. Hodgson, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449; R. v. Grandinetti, [2005] 1 S.C.R.27.
CRAIG BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION (1993).
Robert J. Norris et al., ‘Than That One Innocent Suffer’: Evaluating State Safeguards
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VI. COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
The lack of a legislative response in Canada to wrongful convictions
is also seen with respect to compensation. Canada, unlike many
American states and the United Kingdom, does not have legislation
designed to implement the requirement under Article 14(6) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to provide
compensation for victims of miscarriage of justice. In an attempt to
discharge this mandate, Canadian federal and provincial governments
issued guidelines in 1988 to provide for compensation. Unfortunately,
these guidelines are quite restrictive and require statements either from
an appellate court or from the executive in a free pardon that the person
seeking compensation did not commit the crime. The guidelines exclude
compensation for family members of the wrongfully convicted. They
limit compensation for non-pecuniary losses to $100,000.248 They allow
reductions on pecuniary loss of earnings on the basis of “benefits
received while incarcerated” and lack of due diligence or “blameworthy
conduct or other acts on the part of the applicant which contributed to
the wrongful conviction.”249
Fortunately, most voluntary awards of compensation have not
followed the restrictions in the federal-provincial guidelines. For
example, awards have included compensation for family members
adversely affected by wrongful convictions and damages for nonpecuniary damages well in excess of the $100,000 cap. The highest
amount of compensation has been $10 million to David Milgaard who
spent 23 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Thomas
Sophonow and Clayton Johnson each received $2.5 million. The Ontario
government recently awarded Stephen Truscott $6.5 million after his
1959 murder conviction was overturned and the Ontario Court of
Appeal acquitted him in 2007. Compensation was paid even though the
Court of Appeal did not declare Truscott factually innocent and
subsequently held that it did not have jurisdiction to make such findings.
In addition, Mr. Truscott’s wife, who suffered with him for the 38 years
he was on parole and lived under an assumed identity, received
$100,000. A retired judge who recommended this award to the
government suggested that the ex gratia payment was justified even
though Mr. Truscott would likely not be able to establish fault at a civil
trial and his factual innocence could not be established in the absence of
Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 Albany L.Rev. 1301 (2011).
248. This cap is based on a 1978 judicial cap on non-pecuniary damages in physical injury cases.
Andrews v. Grand and Toy, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229.
249. FEDERAL PROVINCIAL GUIDELINES—COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFULLY CONVICTED AND
IMPRISONED PERSONS (1988). These guidelines have been under review by governments for a number
of years.
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DNA. He also observed that “many if not most of the awards of
compensation”250 made in the last 20 years have departed from the
restrictive federal provincial guidelines.
Although some compensation payments paid to victims of wrongful
convictions in Canada are generous, others are not. Donald Marshall
only received about $250,000 for 10 years of imprisonment, but this was
increased after a public inquiry exonerated him. Almost thirty years
later, the Ontario government offered Tammy Marquardt the same
modest sum despite her 13 years of imprisonment. Such an offer of
compensation to Marquardt is difficult to justify, especially because the
same government compensated William Mullins-Johnson, who served
12 years in prison, with a $4.25 million settlement and both Marquardt
and Mullins-Johnson were wrongfully convicted on the basis of Dr.
Smith’s flawed forensic pathology testimony.251 No compensation has
been offered to others such as Romeo Phillion and Kyle Unger on the
basis that they made false confessions.
Under the Canadian system, a person who brings a civil action will be
responsible for the other side’s legal costs if they are unsuccessful. The
prospect of such adverse costs awards, along with delays in civil
litigation, may deter those who are wrongfully convicted from suing the
state even if they have lawyers prepared to work pro bono or on a
contingency basis. Canadian courts have imposed their own caps on
non-pecuniary damages, such as pain and suffering and loss of family
time.252 Civil litigation brought by the wrongly convicted has
encountered problems based on statutes of limitation,253 a reluctance to
recognize a cause of action for negligent as distinct from malicious
prosecution,254 and the imposition of qualified immunity doctrines when
damages are sought for violation of constitutional rights under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.255 All of these factors help
explain why most compensation cases are resolved out of court. One
notable exception is the case of Rejean Hinse who, in 1961, was
wrongfully convicted of robbery. In 1997, the Supreme Court finally
acquitted him. Represented by counsel acting pro-bono he obtained an
$8.6 million award against the federal government in 2011, 50 years
250. Hon. Sydney Robins QC, In the Matter of Stephen Truscott Advisory Opinion on the Issue of
Compensation, at 21 (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.
ca/english/about/pubs/truscott/robins_report.pdf.
251. News Release, Payments offered to victims of flawed pediatric pathology, Aug. 10, 2010,
available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2010/20100810-goudge-nr-en.pdf.
252. Andrews v. Grand and Toy, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229.
253. Baltrusaitis v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2011 ONSC 532 (Can.).
254. Barton v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2013 NSSC 121 (Can.); Henry v. British
Columbia (Attorney General), 2012 BCSC 1401 (Can.).
255. Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2013 BCSC 665 (Can.).
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after his wrongful conviction.256 The enactment of legislation or
compulsory guidelines to govern compensation in Canada might reduce
the disparity in awards, but also likely lead to less generous payments in
the most egregious cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Essay has provided an overview of wrongful convictions in
Canada. There has been increasing recognition of wrongful convictions
over the last 20 years, but the precise number of wrongful convictions in
Canada remains elusive given ambiguities about what counts as a
wrongful conviction. As in the United States, most acknowledged
wrongful convictions are found in homicide and sexual assault cases. It
is impossible to know how many undetected wrongful convictions have
occurred in other types of cases, including cases where the accused has
pled guilty. An increasing number of wrongful convictions have been
recognized in Canada in the last five years where the accused pled
guilty, often to avoid a harsher sentence. These cases support the idea
that recognized wrongful convictions are only the tip of the iceberg
because they reveal that wrongful convictions can occur in the vast
majority of criminal cases where the accused makes a seemingly
voluntary decision to plead guilty. Even very low error rates would
produce significant number of wrongful convictions given the number
of convictions.
There are two main ways that old convictions are overturned in
Canada, namely appeals out of time or a petition to the Minister of
Justice. In practice, fresh evidence is generally necessary for either
mechanism to be successful. Canadian courts do not strictly enforce
time limits for appeals or the discovery of fresh evidence. In the guilty
plea and other cases, Canadian courts have allowed out of time appeals,
sometimes with the consent of the prosecution, and have overturned
convictions after appeal courts have considered the new evidence.
Canadian prosecutors, who are not elected, have frequently consented to
appeals out of time, the admission of fresh evidence, and the overturning
of wrongful convictions.
In cases where appeals have been exhausted, a petition to the federal
Minister of Justice must be made and that elected politician can order a

256. Hinse v. Quebec, 2011 QCCS 1780. Hinse also sued the provincial Quebec government but
they settled out of court for $4.5 million. The case is also significant because in 1997 Hinse persuaded
the Supreme Court to enter an acquittal in his case, reversing a stay of proceedings originally ordered
when his 1964 conviction was overturned in 1991 after he had served five years in jail and ten years on
parole. R. v. Hinse, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597; R. v. Hinse, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 3; Quebec man wins largest award
for wrongful conviction, GLOBE & MAIL Apr. 15, 2011.
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new trial or a new appeal if he or she concludes that a miscarriage of
justice likely occurred. In cases where the Minister has ordered a new
trial, prosecutors often stay or withdraw charges given the age of the
case, but such actions deprive the previously convicted person of an
acquittal, let alone a finding of innocence which is generally necessary
for compensation. In cases where the Minister orders a new appeal,
appeal courts consider the fresh evidence and decide whether the
conviction now constitutes a miscarriage of justice defined to include
both the conviction of the innocent, unfair trials, and unsafe convictions.
Appeal courts, however, do not make determinations of factual
innocence. In some cases, the appeal court will order a new trial and in
other cases the appeal court will enter an acquittal.
The willingness of Canadian courts to accept fresh evidence without
undue emphasis on whether the accused could have obtained the
evidence at trial and their willingness to grant bail to free suspected
victims of wrongful convictions pending an appeal, or even pending the
Minister of Justice’s petition decision, are two of the greatest strengths
of the Canadian system in responding to wrongful convictions. At the
same time, relatively few people apply to the Minister of Justice to reopen cases. Since 2002, the Minister has ordered new trials or appeals in
15% of all applications. In all but one of these thirteen cases, the result
has been the undoing of the conviction either through the court entering
an acquittal or prosecutors withdrawing or staying the charges. This
suggests that the Minister of Justice only grants remedies in cases where
there is compelling new evidence that the previously convicted person is
not guilty.
The seven public inquiries held in the last 20 years have examined the
causes of wrongful convictions. They include police error, including
tunnel vision; inaccurate eyewitness identifications sometimes
facilitated by improper identification techniques and feedback; false
confessions sometimes facilitated by improper police interrogations; the
use of unreliable witnesses, especially jailhouse informers; lack of full
disclosure by the prosecutor; inadequate defence assistance; and faulty
forensic evidence.
Canada has taken some steps to remedy these causes of wrongful
convictions. The Supreme Court declared a broad constitutional right to
the disclosure of all relevant and non-privileged evidence held by the
prosecutor in recognition that non-disclosure had caused wrongful
convictions. It also declared that the risk of wrongful convictions in all
justice systems make it unsafe to extradite a fugitive without assurances
that the death penalty will not be applied. Some provinces have
responded to wrongful convictions by improving the identification
procedures used by the police and the practice of forensic sciences.
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Some provinces have even conducted pro-active audits in cases
involving suspect forms of evidence to determine the existence of
wrongful convictions.
At the same time, there is much work to be done to lessen the risk of
wrongful convictions in Canada and to improve remedies for the
wrongly convicted. The federal Parliament has refused to exercise its
exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure to regulate
identification and interrogation procedures to minimize the risk of false
identifications and false confessions. In turn, the courts have often been
unwilling to exclude evidence even when the police used techniques
associated with false identifications and false confessions. The appellate
courts have refused to overturn convictions when they have a lurking
doubt about guilt. The federal Parliament has also refused to follow the
recommendations of six public inquiries that the federal Minister of
Justice’s powers to order new trials or appeals be given to an
independent commission that could take a more proactive approach to
the investigation of suspected wrongful convictions. Parliament also has
not legislated a procedure to allow the wrongly convicted to obtain
compensation. The wrongly convicted must demonstrate factual
innocence in order to obtain compensation under restrictive
administrative guidelines, but Canadian courts refuse to make
determinations of factual innocence.
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